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2 Abstract
Private labels -  products controlled by retailers instead of suppliers - are 
an increasingly important market segment for firms worldwide. They, 
and the closely related concept of buyer power, have become a topic of 
major interest and concern for competition authorities around the world.
Firstly we explain the growth of private labels as retailers taking over 
the role of quality certification from suppliers. Consumers, wary about 
product quality, seek reassurance in a brand they can trust, and this 
role of certifying quality is moving downstream from manufacturers to 
distributors. We explain this by modelling the negotiations that takes 
place within the production chain, and demonstrate that by establishing 
a private label a retailer improves his sourcing options and hence his 
bargaining position, and increases his profits.
Next we examine how the presence of private labels in a market affects 
non-price competition between firms, in particular incentives to invest, 
an area which the literature has neglected in favour of a simple focus 
on prices. We demonstrate that, while under certain conditions the con­
ventional wisdom that private labels can reduce suppliers’ investment 
incentives can be correct, the outcome is more complex than tradition­
ally thought. Private labels can also potentially spur suppliers to increase 
investment, which ultimately benefits consumers.
Thirdly we examine the implications of private labels for an argu­
ment of great significance in competition policy: the countervailing buyer
3
power merger defence. We discuss several major cases where this idea -  
that buyer power downstream can prevent wholesale prices rising follow­
ing an upstream merger -  has been crucial in determining the outcome. 
We present a formal model of this argument -  to our knowledge the first 
-  and demonstrate some limitations to the validity of this defence, but 
also highlight circumstances where it may be unexpectedly applicable.
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4 Main Introduction
The dramatic growth of private labels is one of the most important de­
velopments in retailing that has occurred in the past two decades. The 
traditional dominance of large suppliers and their brands has been suc­
cessfully challenged by increasingly confident retailers who in addition 
to selling products are now taking more control of the whole industrial 
structure behind their introduction, development and marketing.
Private labels are complex and multi-faceted, and raise a whole range 
of questions. Various authors have focussed upon different aspects of 
their nature. These include how they affect the positioning of goods 
within the product space, their impact upon competition within and 
between stores and their effect upon retail prices and output. As a result 
it is not to be expected that there can be any one model that entirely 
explores all of the issues they raise, instead there are many different valid 
approaches and avenues of inquiry, each of which can examine different 
aspects of these goods.
Private labels have traditionally fallen into somewhat of a gap be­
tween various academic disciplines. On the one hand the economic lit­
erature on industrial organisation has developed advanced models to ex­
amine the nature of competition between firms. Using formal techniques 
such as game theory and econometrics economists have been able to rigor­
ously explore key issues such as price setting, investment and bargaining 
between firms.
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The power of these models lies in their generality, their results do not 
depend upon the exact products in question, or the names of the firms 
that sells them, but are instead derived from industry fundamentals such 
as the costs of production and the nature of demand. However, the 
strength of these models is often their very weakness, by attempting to 
always be so general such models risk becoming shghtly detached from 
real world developments and failing to address specific issues that policy 
makers and practitioners face. This is to some extent the case with 
private labels, which fall within the realm of such work but have received 
relatively little attention in the literature so far.
On the other hand there are many more applied academic fields such 
as business, marketing and management which often use less technical 
forms of analysis, but more readily address specific real world develop­
ments such as private labels. Such literatures can be very informative; 
many facts are noted, trends described and theories suggested and dis­
cussed. However, the less formal nature of these disciplines can poten­
tially limit their ability to rigorously test the hypotheses they put forward 
and critically evaluate competing explanations for observed outcomes.
This thesis attempts to combine these two separate narratives and 
contribute to a growing formal economic literature on private labels. By 
bringing together the factual insights and ideas of the applied litera­
tures and the formal tools of the economic literature the key issues and 
questions that have been raised with respect to private labels can be
12
addressed.
In the first paper we adopt an entirely new perspective on private 
labels by going back to first principles and reconsidering what role these 
goods fundamentally perform. An argument is developed that the key 
feature of store brands is that they represent the retailer taking over 
the responsibility for quality certification of goods from suppliers. We 
model these goods as being effectively identical to national brands, with 
the only difference being that retailers are responsible for their branding 
instead of suppliers.
By taking this approach we focus attention upon an issue that has 
been widely discussed in the marketing literature, but is only now re­
ceiving attention by economists, and that is how private labels affect the 
vertical relationships between retailers and their suppliers. It has often 
been suggested that the introduction of these goods serves to improve 
a retailer’s negotiating position with those firms it purchases its inputs 
from, but often the mechanism through which this comes about is not 
clearly defined. We show that by establishing a private label a retailer 
can source his inputs more widely, which improves his outside option and 
thereby increases the proportion of industry profits which he is able to 
secure.
In the second paper we examine how private labels affect competition 
between retailers that possess them and those that do not. Unlike most 
of the literature, however, we examine non-price competition between
13
firms, particularly investments into quality. Such alternative forms of 
competition have been relatively neglected by the existing literature, and 
can potentially indicate key dynamic implications of the introduction of 
private labels. We show that both pro- and anti-competitive outcomes 
are possible, that these goods can potentially lead to either higher or 
lower levels of product quality.
In the third paper we examine how private labels fit into wider issues 
that arise in competition policy. More specifically, we model them as pro­
viding a retailer with countervailing buyer power through which he can 
resist an increase in his wholesale price following an upstream merger. 
We then test the argument that the presence of such power means that 
an otherwise problematic upstream merger should be allowed to proceed, 
and demonstrate that such reasoning is potentially flawed as the merger 
can serve to create a barrier to entry into the market, which weakens the 
competitive constraints acting upon the downstream retailer. Therefore 
we demonstrate that the issue of private labels potentially has far reach­
ing implications, with consequences for the debate into buyer power and 
topics in merger control.
14
5 Private Labels and Quality Certification
5.1 In trod u ction
Private labels, often also called own labels or store brands, have seen 
rapid development and growth over the past few decades. Across many 
countries and product categories private labels have achieved high levels 
of market penetration, and are now a crucial feature of many retail mar­
kets. In this article we explore the reasons behind the development of 
these goods, and seek to understand their impact upon competition and 
welfare.
The market most often associated with private labels is grocery re­
tailing, and we emphasise the particular relevance of our model to this 
industry.1 However, it is important to recognise the importance of own 
labels across the whole economy. For example Kumar and Steenkamp 
(2007) note that over 45% of clothes sales in the US are private labels, 
with this figure being over 65% in some product categories. They also 
discuss the importance of store brands in product categories as diverse as 
books and financial services, and note that worldwide private label sales 
are now worth one trillion dollars.
In our model we focus upon the role of branding as providing a form
1For example private labels account for over 40% of all UK grocery sales, and as 
noted by Boston Consulting group (2007), this growth is increasingly broad based. 
They have grown across market categories (packaged food, household goods etc), 
across segments (mass market, premium) and across channels (convenience, online).
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of quality certification for consumers who are wary of product quality.2 
As we argue in our stylised facts in the next section, the role of branding 
is key in consumer good industries but has been relatively overlooked by 
the literature on private labels.
We endogenise the branding process, allowing both suppliers and re­
tailers to engage in brand building. Crucially, we note how this affects 
the bargaining position of firms at both levels of the production chain, 
and determines the division of profits. We find that by establishing a 
private label a retailer improves his negotiating position as he is then 
able to source his inputs from both branded and unbranded suppliers, 
since he is able to sell the products of the latter certified by his own label.
Contrary to the existing thinking of many practitioners, who worry 
they can lead to firms having excessive buyer power, we demonstrate 
that the ability of retailers to establish private labels can only improve 
welfare. W ithout store brands industries may suffer from a lank of any 
quality certification at all because a hold-up problem prevents suppliers 
from investing in brand building. This leads to a market failure where 
both firms and consumers suffer, a problem we show private labels can 
overcome.
The majority of the literature on private labels simply seeks to ex­
amine their introduction and impact in a horizontal context, upon intra­
2 There is of course, following Akerlof (1970), a significant literature on consumers 
buying goods of uncertain quality. The idea of quality certification was introduced 
by Viscusi (1978), while Klein and LefRer (1981) and Shapiro (1983) similarly study 
the incentives of firms to invest in a reputation for high quality.
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store competition with national brands and inter-store competition be­
tween retailers.3 However, in their survey of the literature Berges-Sennou, 
Bontems and Requillart (2004) note that it has also been recognised that 
introducing a private label improves a retailer’s bargaining position with 
respect to his suppliers, though there has been relatively little formal 
research into this.4
One key exception is Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) who note 
that private labels allow retailers to take over the positioning of goods in 
the product space, and allow them to position them as close substitutes 
for branded goods. This improves their outside-option in negotiations 
with suppliers and allows them to obtain preferential terms of supply 
from manufacturers.5
Similarly, Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007) present a model where a 
retailer can stock a private label in addition to a national brand, and 
demonstrate that this threat can lead to price concessions from suppliers 
in exchange for an exclusivity contract where retailers commit to not 
introducing the private label.
One shortcoming of the literature is its failure to explicitly tackle 
the issue of why the market share of private label goods has increased
3For example there is a significant empirical literature on this, see Sethuraman 
(1992), Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar (1995), Ward, Shimshack, Perloff and Harris 
(2002), Putsis (1997) and Bonfrer and Chintagunta (2004).
4Similarly Steiner (2004) notes that "Retailers with large private label sales are 
better able to bargain with manufacturers for a lower price". He quotes the 2000 
Private Label Manufacturers Industry Roundtable, who claim that a strong private 
label allows a retailer to get better deals from manufacturers.
5Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) and Narasimhan and W ilcox (1998) both also 
discuss the impact of private labels upon vertical relationships.
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so dramatically in recent years; if it is in a retailer’s interests to intro­
duce an own label good now, why was it not 20 years ago? We turn to 
this question in an extension and demonstrate a link between increased 
concentration in retail markets and the growth of private labels.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows, in section 2 we review 
the existing literature on private labels and use it to present four stylised 
facts upon which we build our model. In section 3 we briefly lay out a 
basic horizontal model of consumers facing products of uncertain quality. 
In section 4 we develop the main vertical model where we endogenise 
branding decisions and examine the way in which private labels affects 
the bargaining between suppliers and retailers. In section 5 we extend 
our model to investigate the effects of increasing retail concentration on 
the establishment of own labels. In section 6 we conclude.
5.2 S ty lised  Facts ab o u t P r iv a te  L abels
5.2.1 Production
It is important to realise that just because a retailer controls and brands a 
private label, it doesn’t mean he is directly responsible for its production. 
Instead of producing the good himself he may instead outsource its pro­
duction, often to a firm from a competitive fringe of small manufacturers, 
or even to a large manufacturer of branded products.6
6Quelch and Harding (1996) note three reasons for national brand producers 
to manufacture their own competitors. Firstly to use up spare capacity. Secondly, 
because if they didn’t produce them someone else would anyway. Thirdly to diversify 
their activities, particularly over the business cycle as it has been suggested that sales
18
For example, Berges-Sennou, Bontems and Requillart (2004) provide 
evidence from the French dairy sector, noting the existence of all three 
methods of private labels production. All large dairy firms also produce 
private labels, several medium and small manufacturers specialise in pri­
vate labels, and at least one retailer has its own production unit.
If fact, it makes sense for retailers to outsource production because 
they may well lack knowledge of the production processes required to 
manufacture the goods themselves. This point is emphasised by Hughes 
(1996), who notes that
"Most UK food retailers do not have the facilities to manu­
facture their own private label products, so they rely instead 
upon outside suppliers."
Based upon these observations we make the following observation
1. The production of private labels is often outsourced to  
other firms.
This is therefore the approach we adopt here, with private labels 
being manufactured by suppliers not the retailer, which is an important 
difference from much of the existing literature which often makes an 
implicit assumption of self-production by retailers.7
of private labels are anti-cyclical.
7For example see Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007) and Sayman, Hoch and Raju 
(2002 ).
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5.2.2 Quality
Private label goods have traditionally been seen as low quality products, 
with plain packaging and little to no attem pt by retailers to engage in 
brand-building. However, the market has been undergoing rapid change, 
particularly in countries such as the UK where it is well developed. Here 
private labels have succeeded in transforming themselves into effective 
rivals for many of the leading national brands, with their quality being 
seen as comparable to these goods.8 Dobson(2005) notes that
"In contrast to other countries where own-label ranges might 
be seen simply as cheap, low-quality products, own-label goods 
in Britain consist of multi-tiered ranges, from basics (so-called 
“value” lines) to premium goods (e.g., Tesco’s “finest” range), 
with the latter acting as direct rivals to the major branded 
goods."
In a report on private labels Boston Consulting Group (2007) note a 
similar fact, that far from simply being discount products, own labels now 
occupy all market segments including mass-market and even premium. 
In their report they comment on the similarity between private labels 
and established brands.
"Most consumers would be hard-pressed to tell you how man­
ufacturer brands, as a group, differ from ROBs [Retailer Own
8These historical developments are discussed in Hughes (1997).
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Brands]. Prom a shopper’s perspective, they are simply com­
peting brands on a shelf".
This is further emphasised by Thomassen (2007) who discusses a re­
cent Nielsen study which found that more than 50% of UK shoppers 
believe that private label beer or coffee is of same or better quality than 
traditional brands.
This similarity of quality is further emphasised by the point made 
above that private labels are often produced by the very same firms that 
manufacture leading national brands. Quelch and Harding (1996) note 
how widespread this is, commenting that
"More than 50% of U.S. manufacturers of branded consumer 
packaged goods make private-label goods as well."9
We therefore make the following statement
2. Private labels are now often the sam e quality as estab­
lished national brands.
Based upon this observation, we construct a model where consumers 
do not view private labels as being of lower quality than national brands, 
which is a different approach from much of the literature.10
9 For example, they note that Heinz is a major supplier of private-label baby food.
10For example see Mills (1995), Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007) and Scott Morton 
and Zettlemeyer (2004).
5.2.3 Branding
Given the amount of money spent on advertising, it is clear that branding 
is a major feature of consumers goods industries. Quelch and Harding 
(1996) note that branding plays an important role of quality certification, 
claiming that
"Brand names exist because consumers still require an assur­
ance of quality when they do not have the time, opportunity, 
or ability to inspect alternatives at the point of sale."11
They also quote James Burke, former CEO of Johnson and Johnson, 
as saying
"[A brand is] the capitalized value of the trust between a 
company and its customers".
Given the development of private labels, as noted in our second styl­
ised fact, we echo the view expressed by Kumar and Steenkamp (2007) 
who claim that
"Retails now position private labels as brands in their own 
right".12
11 Quelch and Harding were actually making this point with respect to national 
brands, claiming this is an advantage they posses over private labels. However, as 
noted below, we argue such a certification role can be played by all brands, including 
ones controlled by retailers.
12 They quote several examples of strong private label brands including IKEA and 
several owned by Decathlon.
22
/
Therefore, we argue that it is also entirely reasonable to interpret­
ing private labels as performing a similar role of quality assurance as 
established national brands. We therefore state our third stylised fact
3. Branding is a key feature of m odern private labels, and  
plays a crucial role of quality certification.
Therefore, we focus upon the role of branding as quality assurance, 
and private labels as the method by which retailers can take over this 
role from suppliers.
5.2.4 Growth
A key feature of the private labels market has been its dramatic growth 
over the past few decades and, as shown in the following figure from 
Boston Consulting Group (2007), worldwide this is strongly correlated 
with the increasing concentration of retail markets.
Note that this relationship holds both across time within a country, 
and in cross section between countries. The correlation between these 
two variable is further noted by Berges-Sennou, Bontems and Requillart 
(2004) who comment that
"PL penetration, as measured by market share, also increases 
with retail concentration as measured by the CR5."
Based upon these observations of the data, we state our final stylised 
fact
23
Figure 1: Growth of Private Labels and Retailing Concentration
Private Label Continues to Develop as Retailers 
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4. P riv a te  Labels have grown rapidly, and th is  has occurred  
alongside a significant increase in re ta iling  concen tra tion .
Though of course it is important to recognise that correlation doesn’t 
imply any sort of causation, a model of private labels that drew a link 
between increased retailing concentration and the growth of own brands 
would be stronger for fitting these observed facts.
5.3 T he H orizontal M odel
5.3.1 T he Basic S etup
Before moving to consider the vertical aspects of branding, we first es­
tablish a benchmark case with no vertical dimension for comparison. We 
have two retailers, R\ and i?2 in the downstream market. Ri sells a high
24
quality good of quality u, while R 2 sells a low quality product quality u\ 
with u > u. We assume that both retailers can produce their goods at 
constant marginal cost 0, and that we have u > 0 > u. We denote the 
average quality as u — and further assume that we have u < c = 0.
There is one representative consumer, who can buy a variable amount 
of one of the goods in each of two periods; he may not purchase both 
goods, though he may purchase none if he so wishes. Retailers com­
pete by setting their prices pi > 0 simultaneously, these can be changed 
between periods.
We define the following term which we will use later
The consumer’s utility function is a function of the quality of the 
good he purchases, his chosen quantity, and the price set by the retailer. 
It is given by
Taking first order conditions on quantity, we can solve for the con­
sumer’s demand function
We can see that a consumer will purchase a good only if its price is
U{ui,q) = Uiq -  y  - p i q
q = U i -  p i
25
below its (perceived) quality, so there is no profitable trade between the 
consumer and R 2 . In the first period, the consumer decides if to purchase 
the good at all, then who to buy it off, and lastly how much to purchase. 
After buying a good in period one he becomes aware of its quality and 
then has the option of purchasing more of the same good in the second 
period.
We assume the consumer may not switch goods, we motivate this 
assumption by the existence of a large switching cost which would not 
make this worthwhile, for example this could be because a consumer 
would need to expend effort to become familiar with a second product. 
Alternatively this can be explained by recent insights from behavioural 
economics which note that consumers don’t always act optimally; for 
example they may irrationally not wish to expend the effort of considering 
switching products, or may be unduly fearful of the downside risks of 
doing so, and may therefore display undue product loyalty. 13
We generalise our model by assuming that if a consumer purchases a 
product there may be a minimum purchase requirement, which we denote 
as y.u  For example products are generally only available in discrete 
quantities and tend to come in packages of a given size, so it is potentially 
not possible to purchase certain very small quantities. We define the 
following value
13See Howells (2005) for a discussion of consumer behaviour and behavioural eco­
nomics, and how such insights have recently impacted upon consumer policy.
14 Note that we can set y  =  0 and allow infinitely small purchases and our model 
works equally well.
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Here — x is the expected payoff experience by a consumer who pur­
chases a product of expected average quality for zero price. We assume 
that the minimum purchase quantity y is not too large, so that a con­
sumer who purchases such an amount of an expected average quality 
product wouldn’t expect to incur an excessively large loss.
7f
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5.3.2 Observable Quality
We turn  first to the case when the consumer can observe the quality of 
the goods being sold by retailers. In this situation we can ignore the 
issue of competition between retailers because the consumer will never 
want to purchase off the low quality retailer because u < 0 .
We prove the following result for the equilibrium here.
Lem m a 1 In equilibrium the low quality retailer earns zero profits, while 
the total profit of the high quality retailer and utility of the consumer are
U* = 7T
n*Ri = 2 #
27
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Total welfare, the sum of consumer utility and firms’ profits, is there­
fore
W  = 3tt
5.3.3 Unobservable Quality
Previously we considered the special case when the consumer was per­
fectly informed as to the quality of the products sold by the two retailers. 
We now relax this assumption and examine the case when the consumer 
is initially unsure of the quality of the products sold by the two retailers, 
and instead is only aware of the average quality in the market, u. Hence­
forth, where appropriate, we work in terms of expectations of both profit 
and utility based upon this probabilistic choice.
If the consumer does choose to buy a positive quantity of a good in 
the first period, he becomes aware of its true quality. He has the option to 
purchase the same good again in the second period; if the good is revealed 
to be of low quality after purchase in the first period the consumer will 
not exercise this option and will purchase a zero quantity in the second 
period. Alternatively, if the good purchased is revealed to be of high 
quality then the second period will proceed in a similar fashion to the 
case examine above with observable quality.
We can show the following result
28
Lem m a 2 In equilibrium the low quality retailer earns zero profits, while 
the total profit of the high quality retailer and utility of the consumer are
U* — -7T — X  
4
n* =  - ifRl 2
Proof. See Appendix. ■
The consumer will wish to purchase a good in the first period to enable 
him to discover its quality and then have the chance of earning positive 
profits in the second period. But the expected quality of the good is 
u < 0  so he will wish to purchase as little as possible, just enough to 
learn its quality, the minimum amount y. As we demonstrated in the 
proof of Lemma (2), the optimum prices in the first period for both firms 
are zero, hence retailers make zero profits in this period even though one 
of them will make some sales.
Substituting the average quality u and the equilibrium prices 0 into 
the consumer’s utility function yield that in the first period he stands 
to make an expected loss of x. There is a 50% chance that the good he 
purchases in the first period happens to be of high quality, if it is then the 
second period proceeds as in the observable quality case and full period 
profits and utility are earned. Therefore retailer profits are one quarter 
of what they were in the observable case, and the consumer’s utility 
is one quarter minus the expected first period loss x. Note that our
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earlier assumption on the magnitude of x ensures that the consumer’s 
participation constraint is satisfied and he will wish to undertake the 
given strategy described.
We have a total welfare of
u /  3 ~W  —  - 7 T  —  X4
Therefore in this equilibrium where quality is unobservable there is a 
significant market failure. There is a welfare loss of x  in the first period 
when the consumer makes the minimum purchase to test out the quality 
of the good, and there is only a 50% chance that positive welfare will be 
achieved in the second period, if the consumer happened to pick the high 
quality good in the first period.
5.3.4 Certification Equilibria
Prom our results in the last section we see that there is clearly scope for 
some kind of signalling or certification of quality to improve welfare. We 
now consider this possibility, that the retailers are able to engage in the 
branding of their products as a signal of quality, and examine whether 
this is able to solve the market failure that results from the asymmetric 
information about product quality.
We model this by adding an initial stage to the game where retail­
ers are able to engage in quality certification. This stage, undertaken 
before prices are set and the consumer undertakes his purchasing deci­
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sions, features both retailers simultaneously engaging in money burning 
signalling. Here, therefore, we focus on "soft" certification, where money 
spent on advertising creates a strong brand image which indirectly sig­
nifies the high quality of the good to consumers, similar to Milgrom and 
Roberts (1986). However, our model could apply equally well to "hard" 
certification - where high quality firms can spend money on some credi­
ble signal of quality, such as obtaining a certificate from an independent 
quality-monitoring body.
For example the UK Soil Association, a body committed to promoting 
organic food and farming, has a specialist arm "Soil Association Certi­
fication Ltd." which specialises in certifying products as organic. Af­
ter providing detailed information, and allowing inspectors to visit their 
premises, firms that meet the required standards are entitled to declare 
themselves as officially certified organic by the Soil Association and can 
brand their products with the official symbol of the body.
We model retailer Ri deciding what quantity of money 7 * to spend 
on branding his good as a signal of quality. We then see if there is 
a separating equilibrium where the high quality retailer, ith, spends a 
given amount 7 * which serves as a credible signal of his high quality; 
with the consumer having the belief that the quality of the good is high 
only if spending on quality certification by that firm is at least 7 *, and 
the low quality retailer R 2 has no incentive to falsely certify his quality 
as high. We make a small assumption here, which is that if a firm is
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indifferent about investing in establishing a brand, he will not do so. 15 
We have the following result
Lem m a 3 There is a certification equilibrium where only the high quality 
retailer engages in quality certification. The amount he spends on this is
3 .  
7r’ 2 71”
Here the low quality retailer earns zero profits, while the total profit of 
the high quality retailer and utility of the consumer are
U* =TT
Hfij =  2 tt — 7 *
Proof. See Appendix. ■
If R\ decides to engage in signalling, we are effectively in the ob­
servable quality equilibrium from above, while if he decides not to we 
are effectively in the unobservable quality equilibrium. Money burning 
is therefore profitable for him provided the cost of doing so is less than 
the extra profit he stands to make in moving to the observable quality 
situation: | 7r.
If the low quality retailer does not certify then he earns zero profits,
15 This simply serves to remove awkward points of indifference where it is hard to 
pin down an agent’s exact behaviour, ensures that all indifferent firms act in the same 
way, and allows us to focus on our main results. This assumption is entirely realistic, 
a firm is unlikely to spend money now with the hopes of only making it back with no 
profit at a later date because of risk aversion.
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as in the unobservable quality equilibrium, while if he falsely signals his 
good as high quality he earns one period of high quality profits before 
consumers realise and decide not to repurchase his good in the second 
period. He will therefore not choose to engage in quality certification 
provided the cost of doing so is greater than the amount he stands to 
make from it: fr.
Therefore the logic underlying this certification equilibrium is that 
the gains to signalling are greater for the higher quality retailer than 
the low quality one. R 2 only stands to make one period of full profits 
before consumers realise he falsely signalled his quality, while R\ stands 
to make two periods of profit after doing so. Therefore, as long as the 
cost of certification lies between these two levels of profit, it is optimum 
for the high quality retailer to signal his quality but not the low quality 
one to falsely do so.
Given that 7 * is spent on signalling, here we have a total welfare of
W  =  3# — 7 *
We showed that in equilibrium 7 * G [fr, f  7r) , substituting this into 
the above equation therefore yields a welfare level of
3
2 n > W  > —7f 
2
Therefore we see that by being able to engage in quality certification
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welfare has been significantly increased above the level in the unobserv­
able quality case, though it is not as high as in the observable case as 
money needs to be wasted here on signalling.
5.4 T h e V ertical M od el
Now we enhance our basic model to enable us to examine the key issue 
of how the role of quality certification is split between suppliers and 
retailers. We introduce a vertical element into the game; R\ is now 
supplied by one of two upstream suppliers, S\ and S 2, who both produce 
a good of quality u at marginal cost c = 0. Similar to the basic model, 
this vertical chain will now, as a whole, want to engage in the branding 
of its product, but the question of how this will occur within the chain 
is of interest.
Several possibilities come to mind; perhaps each firm will try  to avoid 
paying the certification cost, aiming to free-ride off the branding done by 
the other party in the vertical agreement. On the other hand, if the other 
firms are not engaging in certification it may be in one agent’s unilateral 
interest to bear the financial burden of doing so because the personal ben­
efits of branding outweigh the costs. Alternatively, if being responsible 
for the branding of the product carried some economic benefit, perhaps 
there will be some competition between parties to be the one responsible 
for certifying the quality.
We now have a 3 stage game:
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Stage 1 - Retailers and suppliers make simultaneous certification de­
cisions
Stage 2  - Vertical contracting between the suppliers and Ri.
Stage 3 - The good is sold to consumers. This is the same as the basic 
model, with prices being set and the consumer being able to purchase in 
two sub-periods.
We assume that in stage 1, R\ and the suppliers cannot contract over 
the certification decisions, and thus tha t any money spent on branding 
in stage 1 is sunk.
The vertical contracting takes place as simultaneous Nash bargaining 
with each supplier S j , over a two-part tariff which specifies a combination 
of a per unit price and a fixed fee, (W j,Tj). We argue that modelling con­
tracts between suppliers and retailers as two-part tariffs is more suitable 
than using linear tariffs, which is often assumed in the literature . 16
Two-part tariffs are the simplest contractual form which allow the 
vertical chain to separate the issues of setting the optimal wholesale price 
and distributing the profits between the supplier and retailer. They allow 
the supply chain to overcome the problem of double-marginalisation, and 
are hence more efficient and allow the vertical chain to maximise industry 
profits.
There is also some evidence to support the idea that firms use two- 
part tariffs in practice, Bonnet, Dubois and Simioni (2006) study the
16For example see von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007).
35
bottled water market in Prance and find evidence for non-linear tariffs, 
particularly two-part tariffs. However, the picture is admittedly not en­
tirely clear, Smith and Thanassoulis (2006) examined the UK market for 
milk and found support for linear tariffs, noting that firms use a simple 
per-unit price with no fixed fee element.
Both negotiations are conducted simultaneously meaning that no firm 
has a first mover advantage, and each supplier treats the outcome of 
the other negotiation as given and forms rational expectations about its 
outcome. Suppliers will offer R\ a contract specifying a unit wholesale 
price of c =  0 , as this maximises the joint profit of the vertical agreement, 
and standard outside-option bargaining then takes place over the fixed 
fee, T{. If in equilibrium Ri contracts with supplier Si , when negotiating 
over n  he has an outside option equal to the full value of contracting with 
supplier S j ,  who offers him the full surplus in making his best attem pt 
to win the contract. The suppliers, on the other hand, have no outside 
option as there is no alternative to selling their goods through R \17’, any 
remaining surplus above R \ ’s outside option is split between the retailer 
and the active supplier according to R ^s  bargaining power, a.
In solving this we proceed in four steps. First we analyse what hap­
pens when the vertical chain fails to undertake any certification. Secondly 
we examine the situation when the suppliers take on the role of quality 
assurance. Thirdly we look at the case when the retailer is responsible for
17R \  in this model corresponds to a "gatekeeper" retailer; this is, he has sole access 
to a set of consumers. Any suppliers wishing to reach those consumers must do so 
through him, meaning that he is in a very strong bargaining position.
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quality certification. Then finally we bring all of these strands together 
and, using the insights gained from examining the other situations, solve 
the model when both retailers and suppliers choose whether to engage in 
certification.
5.4.1 N o Certification by the Vertical Chain
Here the two suppliers are identical and thus there is Bertrand compe­
tition between the suppliers and Ri has full outside option and so keeps 
all the profit from the vertical agreement for himself, and is indifferent 
between which supplier he chooses. Hence the suppliers make no profit, 
since they have no bargaining power because they are perfectly substi­
tutable, and other payoffs are similar to the base case.
i?2 makes zero profit because even if the consumer does randomly 
select him in the first purchase period he buys from him at a price of 
zero and doesn’t repurchase in the next period. Consumers have a 50% 
chance of earning one period of full utility in the second period if by 
chance they choose the high quality good in the first period, but stand 
to earn an expected payoff of — x in the first period. Similarly, the high 
quality retailer makes, on average, half a period of profit - in the second 
period if the consumer happens to choose him in the first, no profits are 
made in the first period again because prices are zero.
n * 2 =  n s , =  n j 2 =  0
37
Therefore, just like in the horizontal model with no certification, we 
get a total welfare of
W  = - 7r — x 
4
5.4.2 C ertification by Suppliers
Now we consider the situation when only the suppliers in the vertical 
chain can certify the quality of the product sold by i?i, though R 2 can 
(falsely) certify. As noted previously, spending on quality assurance can­
not be contracted upon, and after a supplier invests money in this it is 
treated as a sunk cost during his negotiations with retailers. There is 
therefore a potential hold-up problem, where welfare improving invest­
ments may not be made because after the money is invested the supplier 
is vulnerable to opportunism by the retailer, who may claim most of 
the extra profit generated. Foreseeing this, the supplier may never make 
the investment in the first place as he knows that he will not be able 
to make sufficient profits after doing so to cover the cost; this may then 
hurt the retailer who loses out through being unable to commit to not
acting opportunistically.18
Solving this model in a manner similar to the basic model, to stop R 2 
engaging in false certification we must have that the cost of certification 
is greater than the single period profits which he can earn from doing so
7  > 7r
We prove a simple result which makes the later exposition easier: 
Lemma 4 Never will both suppliers engage in quality certification
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Henceforth, without loss of generality, we consider the supplier that 
may certify to be S\. Prom the previous section, we know that if S\ 
doesn’t certify then he will make zero profits in equilibrium and that 
if he does then the consumer will purchase the good in equilibrium in 
both periods and total agreement profits will be 27r, which will be split 
between the retailer and supplier.
The retailer has an outside option, he can sell S 2 ’s good unbranded 
and hope the consumer will randomly select it to test in period 1, and 
that then he will thus earn full profits in period 2. This is similar to the 
situation described above with no vertical certification, therefore R f s 
outside option, as established in equation (1), is worth ^fr. The rest of 
the surplus is split according to the retailer’s bargaining strength a:
18See Inderst and Wey (2007b) for a discussion of the hold-up problem, and Chen 
(2003) for an example with suppliers investing in increased product variety.
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n j ,  =  ( 1  -  a) 27r 7T
2 7
n s, =
The retailer benefits from free-riding on the supplier’s certification of 
product quality and now makes positive profits.
H r, =  a2* + ( ! - < * )  o*
t t * 3  ~ 1  -=  2aw +  2V
Thus we have an equilibrium where a supplier engages in quality 
certification (but the low quality retailer doesn’t) if
3
- ( 1  — a ) 7 r > 7 > 7 r
Li
Such a value of 7  exists if
1
a < -
That is, if suppliers have sufficiently strong bargaining power then 
they can overcome the potential hold-up problem and have an incentive 
to engage in branding as they stand to make sufficient profit back later 
to justify the initial expenditure. If this is the case we then have an
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equilibrium here with
7 €
Note that this range is (weakly) a subset of the range found in the 
base case, the ranges are identical when the supplier has full bargaining 
power and keeps all the incremental profit from certification, thus having 
the same incentives as the Ri in the base case. Note that the retailer 
may actually be better off here having a lower bargaining power, as by 
allowing the supplier to keep a larger share of the incremental profits 
after branding it gives him an incentive to do it in the first place - and 
the retailer can then free-ride on the increased profits.
Looking at welfare, we have when a < |
W  = — 7 *
And when a > |  we have
w  3 ~W  = -7T — X
4
5.4.3 Certification by Ri
Now we consider the situation when Ri can certify the quality of the 
product that he sells but his suppliers cannot, R 2 can still falsely certify. 
If R\ does invest in stage 1, we interpret this as him establishing a private
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label, he is now able to sell the goods of the suppliers under his own brand 
name.
After establishing his own label, consumers are reassured by this qual­
ity certification and the previous full information equilibrium results, 
with the good being purchased from R\ in both periods. However, as 
well as increasing the total surplus to 27r, the establishment of the pri­
vate label also affects how it is distributed between suppliers and retailers, 
this is our first key result.
Proposition 5 By engaging in quality certification through establishing 
a private label the retailer can improve his bargaining position with sup­
pliers, as he can now source his good equally well off all suppliers whether 
branded or not. This means he takes all of the profit from the vertical 
agreement.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
If the retailer spends 7  on establishing his private label, his profit is 
now.
nfll = a2n +  (1 — a) 2tt — 7
URl = 2tt -  7  
Other firms will make zero profits.
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n«2 = = nj2 = o
Therefore, for branding to be profitable for R\ he must earn greater 
profits from doing so than from not branding, and attempting to sell an 
unbranded product.
1 .2n — 7  > —7r 
' 2
As noted previously, to prevent R 2 falsely certifying his good as high 
quality we require
7  >  7T
There is thus an equilibrium here with quality certification by R\ for
* r~ 3 ~7  G  7T, -7 T
Which is the same region we identified in the base case model.
5.4.4 Certification by Suppliers or R etailers
Now we proceed to solving the full model, where both suppliers, <Si and 
*5*2 , and the retailers, R\ and R 2 , simultaneously choose whether to certify
43
the quality of the product, and we investigate when in equilibrium it is 
the supplier or the retailer responsible for branding the good. Following 
on from lemma (4), we only consider the possibility in equilibrium that 
Si will certify the product’s quality.
Note that if R\ certifies, the certification decision of the suppliers are 
irrelevant as the retailer is able to successfully market the products of 
both suppliers as high quality, regardless of whether they have engaged 
in certification or not.
In this equilibrium consumers have the belief
U i =  u  < = >  7 ;  >  7 *
They do not distinguish between branding by the supplier and the 
retailer, they care only that the product’s quality has been certified. We 
can now combine the insights of the previous few sections to solve the 
full certification game, which can be represented in the following normal 
form.
Table 1 : Certification Game
Si
Certify Not Certify
Ri Certify
*1*1CM 2 ?f -  7 * , 0
Not Certify |a7T +  7^T , |  ( 1  — a) 7T — 7 * ijf , 0
As previously noted, let us consider a situation where branding will 
occur, so we can focus upon the key issue of who will undertake it. This 
requires the previously noted condition
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We can immediately note that when the supplier is not engaging in 
certification, the retailer will wish to do so himself. Similarly we can 
observe that when the retailer is branding, the supplier will not want to, 
as mentioned above his investment would be redundant as the retailer 
would be free to use the good of either supplier with his own brand. 
This immediately establishes a Nash equilibrium, where only the retailer 
engages in quality certification.
However, let us consider the potential for an equilibrium where only 
the supplier engages in certification. Consider the situation when the 
retailer is not certifying, the supplier will wish to certify if
3
- ( 1  — Q;)7T — 7 * > 0
7* <  (1 -  a )
However, also consider the behaviour of the retailer when the supplier 
is certifying; he will wish to certify in addition to the supplier if
Note that these are the same conditions. So we have that whenever 
the supplier would wish to certify (with the retailer not certifying), the 
retailer would wish to additionally certify afterall - and as noted above 
this would mean that the supplier would then wish to stop certifying. So 
there is no equilibrium where only the supplier engages in branding of 
the good.
The logic is as follows; when the retailer brands he keeps all the 
profits from the agreement, his incremental profit from branding here is 
therefore the supplier’s profit (from when only the supplier was brand­
ing). Therefore, whenever it is worth the supplier engaging in branding, 
because his profits are greater than the cost, it must necessarily also be 
so for the retailer because he can steal this exact same profit from the 
supplier, for the same cost.
We put these findings into our next key result
Proposition 6 The only equilibrium with branding occurs with the re­
tailer Ri verifying the quality of the good; suppliers never engage in 
branding.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Thus the only equilibrium we have is one where R\ engages in brand­
ing by spending some amount 7 * E [#, §7r), in contracting with the
suppliers he is able to sell either good equally well under his brand so 
he keeps all the profit from the vertical relationship, being supplied at 
marginal cost 0 with no fixed fee. The consumer forms beliefs that this 
branding implies that that the good is high quality and purchases it 
in period 1 , and after verifying that its quality is indeed high he then 
repurchases it in period 2 .
Dr2 = = nj2 = 0
=  2t t - 7 *
U =  7T
This gives us total welfare of
W  = 3fr — 7 *
5.5 A n alysis and  P o licy  Im p lica tion s
So our results indicate that retailers develop private labels as it allows 
them to source their goods from a wider variety of suppliers; from those 
without brands of their own as well as those that produce established 
national brands. This serves to improve their bargaining position with 
respect to suppliers, as they can more credibly threaten to switch to a
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rival manufacturer should they not receive preferential terms of supply. 
Technically, establishing a private label enhances a retailers outside op­
tion in his negotiations, which ensures him a greater share of the profits 
of the vertical chain.
This effect links into the wider concept of buyer power, which has 
been a growing area of research in the literature on vertical contracting 
between suppliers and retailers .19 Some commentators have expressed 
concern about the growth of this buyer power, and therefore about the 
rapid development of private labels, worrying that it could lead to anti­
competitive outcomes in both upstream and downstream markets. For 
example, in the UK Competition Commission inquiry into the grocery 
market some market participants were worried that the ability of powerful 
buyers to obtain preferential terms of supply could potentially threaten 
the long term viability of manufacturers.
However, contrary to these views, we get the following result concern­
ing the welfare implications of private labels in our main model
Proposition 7 The ability of retailers to establish private labels (weakly) 
improves welfare.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
The intuition behind this result is that without private labels the 
market can suffer from a hold-up problem; that suppliers will fail to
19Important contributions include Katz (1987), Inderst and Shaffer (2007a) and 
Inderst and Wey (2007a).
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engage in certification if their bargaining power is sufficiently low as they 
wont be able to recoup sufficient profits to cover the costs of doing so. 
In these circumstances, the ability of retailers to establish a private label 
can overcome this problem and increases both the profits of firms and 
the consumer’s utility.
5.6  G row th  o f  P r iv a te  L abels
Proposition (6 ) established that suppliers will never brand goods, because 
the moment it becomes profitable for them to do so, it becomes profitable 
for the retailer to brand himself, making the suppliers’ actions redundant. 
This result seems at odds, however, with empirical observation which 
have shown suppliers traditionally dominating the role of branding within 
the vertical chain. We turn to an extension which can explain why private 
labels have grown over time, linking it into our fourth stylised fact which 
recognised that this growth has occurred alongside an unprecedented 
increase in concentration in retailing markets.
Assume there are n > 2 distinct symmetric downstream markets; 
each market i has the same structure as the market described in the 
previous models, that is there is a high quality retailer .R i^ and a low 
quality retailer Ri 2 . We also assume that these downstream markets 
are completely separate on the demand side - there is no substitution 
between them. However, it is the same set of two suppliers, Si and S2 , 
that sell to the high quality retailer, i?; i, in all markets. This setup
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corresponds to a situation where large national suppliers sell to several 
distinct local geographic markets, with the retailers being independent 
stores not part of any national chain .20
This setup intuitively appears to provide a situation where suppliers 
may play some role in branding afterall, because they stand to gain the 
benefits of this across several markets, whilst paying the cost only once. 
Let us again consider the payoffs in the branding subgame; note that since 
all high quality retailers Ri^ face symmetrical decisions, we will have a 
symmetric solution each Ri i chooses the same strategy in each market. 
We present a "reduced" version of the normal form game below; note 
that since we look for symmetric equilibria we only need to examine the 
decision of a representative Ri, not each R % \ individually, which makes 
representing the game simpler.
Of course, when considering deviations by R i, we must consider a 
unilateral deviation by a single Ri i in one market, not a common de­
viation by all R is .  However, because the payoff to a particular retailer 
R t i is independent of the actions of all other high quality retailers R jj  
we can accurately solve for an equilibrium by analysing the decision of a 
representative retailer.
The only difference in the payoffs in his case is when the supplier 
certifies and the retailer doesn’t, in which case the supplier makes n 
times the flow profit, which reflects his presence in multiple markets.
20 Such a multiple-market setup was first used by Katz (1987), and has been adopted 
in other papers, such as Inderst and Wey (2007a).
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Table 2: Certification Game with Multiple Markets
Si
Certify Not Certify
Ri Certify 2tt — 7 * , —7 * 2tt — 7 * , 0
Not Certify f aTf +  Iff , fn  ( 1  -  O') fir — 7 * { 7T , 0
Solving the game ,we can see that there is still an equilibrium with only 
the retailer certifying quality; however let us also consider the possibility 
of an equilibrium where (just) the supplier is responsible for certifying 
the quality of the good.
For this we require it to be in the supplier’s interests to establish a 
brand
3
- n (  1 — a) 7r — 7 * > 0 
3
7 * < - n  ( 1  — a) 7r 
z
And also for it to not be worth the retailer establishing a private label
3 1
- a f i  H— 7f >  27r — 7
2 2  ~  1
7 * > ^ ( 1  -  ol) tt
Proposition 8 With suppliers selling to multiple downstream markets, 
there is an equilibrium where the supplier is responsible for the branding 
of the good.
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Proof. See Appendix. ■
In this equilibrium we have
n Si = o™(1 - 7 *  > o
I T -  3  - ^ 1 -n * ,,  =  2 a7r +  2 W
n s2 =  n i ,,2 =  0
We can use this result to explain why private labels have grown so 
much in recent decades. Previously the grocery market resembled this 
multiple-market setup, before chain stores each retailer operated in a 
limited area, and was relatively small compared to the national suppliers 
they dealt with. Then, however, national chain retailers developed, a 
situation we can interpret in our model as a merger occurring between 
each of the n retailers R^i to form the single retailer Ri we had in our 
base-case vertical model.21
This structural change in the industry alters the relative incentives 
of the suppliers and retailers to invest in maintaining a brand name, 
and as we have seen in our original model there is no equilibrium with 
suppliers taking responsibility for quality certification. In other words,
21 Technically, such a merger would result in a slightly different situation to that 
presented in the earlier model, as the presence of several markets would serve to 
multiply the flow profits by n. However, this doesn’t affect any of the qualitative 
results.
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the growth of national chain retailers has directly led to the growth of 
private labels.22
5 .7  C onclusions
Private labels are a market segment of increasing size and importance to 
both firms and regulators. Their market share has surged over the past 
20 years in countries around the world, and appears destined to continue 
to do so, and they now account for a large proportion of the goods sold 
by grocery retailers worldwide.
Economists are belatedly catching onto the importance of private 
labels, and have begun to study the repercussions of their growth. How­
ever, most of the existing work examines their impact in a horizontal 
framework, looking at intra-store competition between private labels and 
national brands or how they affect inter-store competition between dif­
ferent retailers. We claimed that arguably the most important impact 
of private labels is the way in which they affect the vertical relationship 
between retailers and suppliers, an area which has received insufficient 
attention, and which we made the focus of our paper.
We based our model on observable facts, including that private labels
22Further to our main result, we can also note that the more distinct markets 
that the supplier is selling to in this multi-market setup (that is, the larger suppliers 
are compared to retailers) then the greater is the range of 7 for which an equilibrium  
with supplier certification exists. To some extent this arguably can be intuitively inter­
preted as it being more likely that suppliers will be the ones responsible for branding 
the product than retailer, the larger suppliers are. So, in addition to our main point 
which examined a distrete shift in industrial structure from independent retailers to 
chain stores, this intuitive argument appears to support a similar conclusion for a 
more gradual growth of retailing concentration.
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are essentially the same products as national brands, only branded under 
the retailer’s name rather than the supplier’s, and that their growth has 
been accompanied by a rapid increase in the concentration of the retailing 
market.
We developed a model of retailing with a vertical aspect, allowing us 
to study the effect of private labels on the bargaining process between 
suppliers and retailers. Consumers are unsure about the quality of the 
products they purchase, and hence only wish to purchase branded goods 
- seeing this as a signal of quality. The branding process is thus en- 
dogenised, with both suppliers and retailers able to take responsibility 
for it, meaning there is an element of vertical competition within the 
production chain to undertake the role of providing quality certification.
For the branding process we focussed upon soft certification, where 
quality is signalled through spending on advertising in a money-burning 
fashion, but noted our results could equally well apply to hard certifica­
tion, where firms spend money to gain accreditation from a trusted third 
party. We were able to show that private labels can only improve welfare, 
as they can overcome a potential hold-up problem when the supplier has 
insufficient incentives to certify the quality of the product himself.
The underlying logic of our model recognises that the retailer has 
an incentive to establish a private label, as possessing one increases his 
supply options; he becomes able to sell goods produced by suppliers that 
lack a brand of their own, as he can package the good under his own
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brand to signal its high quality to consumers. This improves his outside 
option when negotiating with manufacturers, and hence allows him to 
secure discounts on his inputs.
One advantage of our approach is that by endogenising the establish­
ment of private labels it allows us to examine why they have grown so 
dramatically over the past few decades. We linked this into our obser­
vation of increased retail concentration; this has increased the relative 
incentive of retailers to be responsible for branding the good as opposed 
to suppliers.
5.8  A p p en d ix
5.8.1 P roof of Lemma 1
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by first calculating 
the consumer’s demand function given the prices set by the retailers, 
p Ri. We then substitute this into the retailers’ profit functions in order 
to find the optimum price for them to set to maximise their profits. The 
two periods will proceed identically since nothing will change, nor will 
information be revealed, between the two.
The consumer will never purchases the low quality good because u < 
0 , so it follows directly that R 2 will earn zero profits
n*2 = o
For the high quality retailer, Ri,  the consumer’s demand function is
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QRi — U — Pr x
Substituting this into the retailer’s profit function, he would maximise 
his profits and set
u
Pfll =  2
The consumer will therefore purchase
Qk =  j  > 0  
And will earn equilibrium utility in period 1 of
And the retailer would earn profits in period 1 of
After purchasing the good and confirming that its quality was in fact 
u, this stage-game equilibrium would be repeated in period 2 . So overall 
utility and profit levels would be twice these levels, giving us
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U*=  7T
n  ^  =  27T
5.8.2 P roof of Lemma 2
Again we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, and 
therefore proceed from the last period. Here, if the consumer has pur­
chased a positive quantity of either good in the first period he becomes 
fully informed as to the quality of both products. Given the existence of 
the switching cost the consumer only has the option of purchasing more 
of the good he bought in the first period. If by chance he purchased 
the low quality product in the first period he will purchase zero of it 
in the second period, while if he bought the high quality good then the 
game proceeds as in the full information case analysed earlier and the 
consumer’s demand function is, as derived above, = u — prx .
In this case, facing this demand function, Ri would optimally set 
price p*Ri — | . There is therefore a \  chance that both consumer and R\ 
will earn a payoff of zero in the second period, and a \  chance that the 
consumer will earn utility |  and Ri earn n.
Turning now to the first period we consider the consumer’s purchas­
ing decision given that the two retailers have already set their prices. His 
utility function, with a positive quantity purchased, is thus an expec-
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tation, with the consumer anticipating what may happen in the second 
period as noted above. His utility from purchasing product i in the first 
period is thus.
> 0) = \ uqi -  — ~  ViQi 1 + 21
U ( Q i  >  0) = f
1 /  2 1 (  u \
Note that the utility earned in the second period is independent of 
the quantity purchased in the first period (as long as that quantity is 
positive so that the quality of the good is revealed). We can take first 
order conditions to give us a demand function so that we can solve for 
the quantity purchased of the good he chooses to buy in the first period.
qi = u - p l
So, the probabilistic outcome in this case results in the consumer 
having a demand function the same as if he faced a good of the average 
quality u for certain. Also note that the price of the product only enters 
the consumers utility function in terms of what he must pay to purchase 
the product; the consumer’s beliefs on quality are independent of the 
price charged by either retailer. Therefore, given this utility function the 
consumer will thus buy whichever good is cheapest in the first period.
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Retailers will anticipate this and will therefore in the first stage of the 
game, irrespective of their quality level, engage in Bertrand competition. 
Equilibrium prices will therefore be
p k  = p k  = 0
The consumer is therefore indifferent between purchasing the two 
goods and he will pick one at random.
q: = u <  0
Since u < 0, the consumer will prefer to purchase as little as possible 
in the first period, but will want to purchase some positive amount so 
he becomes aware of the product’s quality and has the possibility of 
earning positive utility in the second period. Therefore, the consumer 
will purchase the minimum quantity y of one good (chosen at random) 
in period 1 .
His utility in period 1 is
Ui{y) = u y -  y  =  - x  < 0
The consumer’s overall level of utility is therefore the expected payoff 
in the second period minus the expected loss in the first
U* = — 7T — X  
4
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Note that given our earlier assumption on x , the consumer’s partici­
pation constraint is satisfied as U* > 0.
For the low quality producer # 2 , we have
Because if the consumer doesn’t randomly purchase from him he 
makes zero; if he does purchase off him in period one he sells y units 
but at a price of zero, so no profit is made. Then when the quality is 
revealed to be low, no purchase in made in period two, so again total 
profits are zero.
For the high quality producer R\ we have
Again, if the consumer doesn’t randomly purchase from him he makes 
zero; if he does purchase off him in period one the price is zero so no profit 
is made initially. Then when the quality is revealed to be high, R\  will
raise his price to p* = |  and earn full profits in period 2 .
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5.8.3 P roof of Lemma 3
Again we solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium here, considering the 
actions of consumers given the certification decisions of retailers, and 
then solving for the optimum money-burning decisions of firms who take 
this consumer behaviour into account. If R\ engages in successful money- 
burning then the consumer, as noted, will believe his good is high quality 
and we will effectively be in the full information equilibrium we solved 
earlier. As shown previously, in such a situation the retailer will set 
a price of |  and will have a flow profit of I I =  2n; the consumer will 
purchase off him in the first period, and then after verifying the quality is 
high he will repurchase in the second period. Taking into account the cost 
of the branding undertaken in the first stage, the retailer’s profits will be 
2tt — 7 . On the other hand, if R\ decides not to engage in branding then 
we will be in the unobservable quality situation just described where 
consumers engage in product testing, where the high quality retailer’s 
expected profits are only \ i r.
Bearing this consumer behaviour in mind, R\ will therefore be willing 
to spend an amount 7  on branding if
27T — 7 > - 7T 
' 2
3 .
1 < r
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However, for such a separating equilibrium to work we also need it 
to not be profitable for the low quality retailer to falsely certify his good 
as high quality. If R 2 engages in such false certification, given the con­
sumer’s belief that any good with sufficient spent on branding is high 
quality, he will earn full single period profits 7f in the first period. How­
ever, after realising the good is in fact low quality, the consumer will not 
repurchase the good in the second period and thus no further profits will 
be made. This means that his total profits from certification, net of the 
cost of doing so, are ff — 7 . On the other hand if R 2 doesn’t engage in 
quality certification we end up in the situation above where the consumer 
"tests" the goods in the first period, and we have shown above that in 
such a situation we have n ^ 2 =  0 .
For R 2 to not engage in money burning we need
7T — 7  < 0
7 >  7f
So, combining these two conditions, we see that there is a set of equi­
libria with money burning where only the high quality retailer engages 
in branding and successfully signals his high quality to consumers. We 
therefore have
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5.8.4 P roof of Lemma 4
Only one supplier can supply R± in the subgame perfect Nash equilib­
rium, denote the supplier that does not supply as 5*, we have
n 5i =  0  -  < 0
That is, he makes zero flow profits, but incurs the cost of certification, 
so overall makes losses. This supplier therefore has a profitable unilateral 
deviation: to switch to not certifying in stage 1 where he can guaranteed 
himself zero profits.
5.8.5 P roof of Proposition 5
The good of either supplier can be branded by R ^ s  private label, whether 
branded or not, so both can be sold for equal profit. This means that
they are perfectly substitutable, and hence the retailer has a full outside 
option, so can keep the entire surplus from agreement. Putting this for­
mally, the general Nash bargaining solution, following Nash (1950), states 
that when a retailer with an outside-option worth O r  and a supplier with 
no outside option bargain over a total payoff of X , the equilibrium payoff 
to the retailer is
U R =  (1 — a )  O r  +  a X
In the case here we have that the retailer can source equally well from 
both suppliers, so he has a full outside option in negotiations; O r  = X .  
Substituting this in we see that we get
IT# — (1 — a) X  -4- cx.X
n R = x
That is, the retailer takes all of the profits from the negotiations.
5.8.6 P roof of Proposition 6
We solve for the Nash equilibrium of the normal form game, there are 
three cases to consider. Firstly, as noted above, with 7 * < | 7r (1  — a) 
if the retailer were not certifying, the supplier would wish to; but as 
soon as the supplier does the retailer also wants to. Secondly, with 7 * >
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| t t (1  — «), even if the retailer were not certifying, the supplier would 
not wish to. Thirdly is the special case when 7 * =  | 7r (1 — a), here we 
invoke our earlier assumption that when indifferent a firm will choose not 
to certify, so there is no Nash equilibrium with the supplier engaging in 
branding with this parameter value either.
5.8.7 P roof of Proposition 7
We compare the results of this full vertical model to those when only the 
suppliers were capable of certifying the quality of the product. If we have 
a  < | ,  tha t is if suppliers have most of the bargaining power, then the 
ability of retailers to create a private label has no impact on welfare, it 
is 37r — 7 * irrespective.
However, with a > |  we found that welfare without private labels was 
only | it — x because of the hold-up problem; this compares to 3# — 7 * 
when private labels are possible. Given that we have 7 * € [ff, §7f), it 
therefore follows that 37r — 7 * > | 7f — x  and that private labels in this 
case increase welfare.
5.8.8 P roof of Proposition 8
Solving for the Nash equilibrium of the normal form game, we see that 
such an equilibrium exists when we have
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Note that, since we have n > 2, this region is non-empty, provided 
the retailer does not have all the bargaining power, that is (1  — a) > 0 .
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6 Private Labels and Supplier Investm ents
6.1  In tro d u ctio n
Private labels are products that are owned and controlled by retailers, as 
opposed to suppliers which is traditionally more common. These goods, 
often called store-brands or own-brands, have become more prominent in 
recent years due to their increasingly significant role in retailing markets 
worldwide. The industry most often associated with private labels is the 
grocery market, where private labels have been present in some form for 
several decades, but these products play a major role in a whole range 
of industries across the economy.
Table 3 from Kumar and Steenkamp (2007) shows the % of sales ac­
counted for by private labels in consumer packaged goods industries, and 
demonstrates that they have achieved high levels of market penetration 
around the world, averaging 14% worldwide in 2000, forecast to reach 
2 2 % by 2 0 1 0 .
Kumar and Steenkamp discuss several industries where, perhaps un­
expectedly, private labels are of major importance. For example they 
note that 45% of clothes sold in the US are private labels, with this fig­
ure reaching over 65% in some categories. This has been driven by the 
success of several major private label only stores such as Gap, H&M and 
Zara. They also discuss how Barnes & Noble are aiming for 10-12% of 
their book sales to be private labels by 2008. Even financial services
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have seen a huge growth in private labels, with savings accounts, loans, 
insurance and credit cards now offered by major highstreet retailers.
Table 3: Consumer Packaged Goods Private Label Share
Private Label Share (% of Sales)
2 0 0 0 2010 (Expected)
Western Europe 2 0 30
North America 2 0 27
Australasia 15 2 2
Latin America 3 9
Japan 2 1 0
Eastern Europe 1 7
China 0 .1 3
Furthermore, these market shares are the result of a long and steady 
upwards trend in their sales over the past twenty years, and this seems 
likely to continue as countries with less developed private label industries 
catch up with those countries where the segment is more fully evolved. 
Understanding the underlying economic dynamics behind the introduc­
tion and development of these goods is therefore crucial in obtaining a 
grasp of the competitive forces at play in these markets, and for guid­
ing policy makers who are confronted with difficult questions as these 
products become increasingly important.
In addition, as well as having an impact within the horizontal frame­
work of the retailing industry, private labels also have vertical implica­
tions. That is, they affect the upstream suppliers in the production chain, 
and their relationship with retailers at the downstream level.
One accusation levelled at private labels is tha t they can further con­
tribute to the buyer power of downstream retailers, particularly large
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chain stores, as they improve their bargaining position with suppliers 
and enable them to demand preferential terms of supply. In turn, this 
issue of buyer power has been a major topic of debate for competition 
authorities, with it having been alleged that the exercise of buyer power 
could reduce welfare and make consumers worse off.
For example the UK Competition Commission grocery market inquiry 
specifically raised concerns that buyer power could harm both suppliers 
and consumers. They alleged that suppliers could be hurt by buyer power 
as it could allow retailers to impose unexpected costs upon them, reduce 
their overall profitability and expose them to excessive risks. The po­
tential detriment to consumers could then follow from this, with reduced 
capacity, fewer new product offerings, and lower product quality - our 
specific focus here .23 To fully understand and check the veracity of these 
claims requires a fundamental grasp of the underlying economic logic for 
the creation and development of these goods, and a model which can 
highlight the impact of private labels upon competitors and therefore 
competition.
Our paper seeks to explore these issues by developing a model of the 
introduction of private labels by retailers, in particular by large chain- 
stores who have been identified as the major force behind the growth of 
store-brands.24 We seek to examine how the sale of a private label by a
23 Competition Commission (2008), The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market 
Investigation, paragraphs 9.3 and 9.5.
24 Competition Commission (2008) notes how in the UK the growth in private label 
sales has been led by the large grocery retailers. (Appendix 9.10, paragraph 3).
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retailer affects the incumbent supplier’s incentives to invest and innovate, 
and how this in turn affects downstream competition and consumers.
We focus upon the role of improvements in quality because investment 
has been identified as a key feature of product competition in grocery 
markets, and antitrust authorities have expressed specific concern that 
private labels could have a potentially anti-competitive impact in this 
regard. However, such dynamic effects have been neglected in the private 
label literature in favour of a simple focus upon wholesale prices, an 
approach which risks overlooking a potentially key mechanism for the 
introduction of private labels to have an impact upon welfare.
For example the UK Competition Commission crucially considered 
such a question in their study into the grocery market, noting that
"the presence of own-label products may reduce investment 
into innovation by branded product manufacturers." 25
This may be particularly anti-competitive because, in addition to 
reducing the quality of products that consumers purchase, it can serve to 
further weaken competition between retailers downstream. Large stores 
who have their own brands are protected from such a reduction in the 
quality of the supplier’s goods, but smaller independent retailers without 
private labels are forced to stock these items, and would then be at a 
further competitive disadvantage to the larger stores.
25 Competition Commission (2008), The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market 
Investigation, Appendix 9.10: Own-Label Goods, paragraph 41.
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Such an outcome may in fact be part of the motivation to establish a 
private label in the first place, using these goods as a competitive weapon 
to reduce the quality of goods sold by rivals in order to further monopolise 
the market. We note how this argument is intuitively similar to those of 
"raising rivals costs", except here the mechanism is not a higher cost but 
a lower quality.
The importance of own labels is recognised in Boston Consulting 
Group (2007), who note that private labels are now sold in all segments 
- including premium ones - and often compete with traditional goods on 
quality and branding. Hughes (1997) describes how, although when first 
introduced private labels were mainly low quality generic products sold 
cheaply, from the 1980s onwards there has been a major shift in the na­
ture of these goods, moving upmarket and being targeted more at middle 
and upper class consumers.
Several papers on private labels have featured a role for product qual­
ity in some form or another, though often this simply consists of mod­
elling private labels as being of exogenously lower quality than branded 
goods, reminiscent of the industry paradigm pre-1990s. This is the case 
in, for example, Mills (1995), Bontems, Monier-Dilhan and Requillart 
(1999), Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) and Gabrielsen and Spr- 
gard (2007). However, the focus of these papers is not upon the dynamic 
effects of the introduction of private labels, but on the wholesale prices 
paid by retailers and the final prices paid by consumers.
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In a similar vein to our paper, both Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer 
(2004) and Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002) examine the issue of the 
positioning of goods within the product space. However, they examine 
the positioning in a horizontal context, with different market segments, 
not in the vertical context of product quality as we do. Mills (1999) 
discusses product quality, and notes that the incumbent supplier in an 
industry can have an incentive to innovate to widen the quality gap 
between his product and the private label to increase his profit.
Berges-Sennou and Mitraille (2003) model the incentives of firms to 
invest in improving the quality of their products; they have an upstream 
monopolist investing in a good before selling it on downstream to another 
monopolist. However, they interpret a private label slightly differently 
to ourselves (and most of the literature) in viewing it as a long term con­
tract between the upstream and downstream agents, where the retailer 
agrees to pay part of the supplier’s investment costs in exchange for joint 
ownership of the product being sold, which serves to overcome the hold­
up problem and encourage investment. This stands in contrast to our 
approach of modelling a private label as the retailer possessing his own 
good which he controls entirely, and which competes with the supplier’s 
good in downstream markets.
Our results show that competition concerns about private labels may 
be misplaced, we demonstrate that the presence of private labels can in 
fact potentially make consumers better off. The potential competition
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provided by the private label serves to spur the incumbent supplier to 
invest more in his product, so consumers benefit from purchasing higher 
quality goods.
However, we also demonstrate that the opposite is indeed possible, 
and that the fears of competition authorities may in some instances be 
justified. The introduction of a private label by a large chain retailer 
can in some instances cause the incumbent supplier to reduce his level 
of investment, which can harm consumers. Furthermore, we discuss how 
this can damage the profitability of smaller independent rivals to the 
chain, and could potentially lead to their exit and the foreclosure of 
downstream markets.
Therefore we ultimately find that the effect of the introduction of 
private labels is ambiguous, and that competition authorities should use 
a rule-of-reason approach in assessing the impact of these products, en­
suring their findings are evidence led.
The paper is structured as follows, in Section 2 we construct the basic 
model, in Section 3 we examine the introduction of private labels. In 
Section 4 we analyse the implications of our model for consumers and 
discuss implications for policy. Section 5 concludes. Proofs can be found 
in the Appendix.
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6.2 T h e B a sic  M od el
6.2.1 Setup
We consider a model where upstream we have a monopoly supplier S  
who can produce as much of an intermediate good as he wishes at a 
marginal cost of zero; we denote the quality of this good as u s . Retailers 
require one unit of inputs to produce one unit of output, there is no 
transformation cost and the quality of the final good equals the quality of 
the input good. Downstream there are N  symmetric markets, each with 
two retailers, which are entirely separate on the demand side; for example 
we can interpret this setup as there existing several local geographic 
markets, for example in different towns.
There is a chain store which owns one of these outlets in each of nc  < 
N  of the markets, this setup follows Katz (1987) and serves to generate 
buyer power without seller power; all the commonly owned stores are in 
separate markets.
We have the following timing for the game:
• In stage 1 the supplier makes a fixed cost investment to improving 
the quality of his product, u s .
• In stage 2 the supplier and retailers negotiate over supply contracts.
•  In stage 3 there is downstream Cournot competition between re­
tailers.
We focus in stage 1 upon investments that improve the quality of the
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supplier’s good, as R&D is a key feature of many retail markets but has 
been relatively ignored by the private label literature. Given the central 
role played by such non-price competition, it is essential for any model 
that attem pts to understand the impact of private labels to take into 
account such dynamics.
This is echoed in Boston Consulting Group (2007) who note that the 
traditional suppliers that have been best able to cope with the growth 
of private labels are those that "create brand advantage by investing in 
genuinely superior product performance, a continuous stream of inno­
vations", which further emphasises the importance of such competitive 
dynamics.
The supplier’s costs of investment as a function of his desired level of 
quality us  are
C M  =  &
Where 7  parameterises the level of costs. This investment function 
is somewhat similar to the one used in Bontems, Monier-Dilhan and Re- 
quillart (1999), although in their paper they model the level of marginal 
costs not fixed costs.
While in some circumstances it may make sense to have marginal 
production costs increase with the quality of the good, for example if 
more is spent on higher quality inputs, generally speaking we argue that 
our approach of modelling higher quality as incurring a greater fixed cost
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seems more appropriate.
For example, higher quality may come about because of investments 
in production technology that improve a product and make it worth more 
to consumers. Alternatively, money spent on investment may allow the 
firm to modify the good so as to be able to produce different versions of 
the same product that suit different categories of consumers better .26
On the other hand, if we interpret "quality" not as the actual quality 
of the good, but simply how it is perceived by consumers, then we can 
interpret investments as being spending on advertising and branding, 
which is a cost that is independent of quantity produced.
We model the vertical contracting that takes place between suppliers 
and retailers as standard simultaneous Nash bargaining over two-part 
tariffs with secret contracts .27 That is, each contract specifies a fixed fee 
and a per unit wholesale price to be paid by each retailer i of 
so that a retailer that sells a quantity qi incurs total costs of C; =  +
Wiqi when qt > 0, and =  0 when q% = 0. We argue that this is 
a more realistic form of contracting than using linear tariffs, which is 
often assumed elsewhere in the literature, as it allows the vertical chain 
to overcome the double-marginalisation problem .28 Bonnet, Dubois and 
Simioni (2006) found evidence to support the idea that firms do in fact
26For example size, age, gender, preferences on product colour or general branding 
for different tastes/interests/social groups.
27The assumption of secret contracts follows Hart and Tirole (1990) and McAfee 
and Schwartz (1994), and realistically reflects the fact that firms place great emphasis 
on protecting business secrets.
28For example see von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007).
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contract using non-linear tariffs, specifically two-part tariffs.
When the supplier negotiates with both retailers in a market he does 
so simultaneously, meaning that no firm has a first mover advantage and 
each retailer treats the outcome of the other negotiation as given and 
forms rational expectations about its outcome. The payoff a firm earns 
through bargaining are equal to its outside option (what it could earn if 
negotiations broke down) plus a share of the surplus; we assume that the 
supplier has exogenous bargaining power 1 — a.29
We follow Singh and Vives (1984) in modelling each market as hav­
ing a representative consumer with the following quadratic and strictly 
concave utility function30
9; +  2* 9 j  +  O oU  =  Uiqi +  U j q j -----------   -  -  Ptqt -  P jq j
This gives us an inverse demand function for firm z of
Pi  =  U i - q i -  q3
Before turning to investigate investment incentives we begin by estab­
lishing the single market equilibrium in this framework, with two retailers 
selling different quality goods and competing in quantities.
29 The Nash bargaining solution, following on from Nash (1950), gives us the re­
sult that if we have a retailer with an outside-option worth O r  and a supplier 
with one worth O s ,  and they bargain over a total payoff of X ,  the equilibrium  
payoff to the retailer is 11#  =  (1 — a)  O r  +  a ( X  — O s ) ,  and to the supplier is 
IIs =  a O s  +  (1 — cx) ( X  — O r )', which demonstrates the relationship between out­
side options, the sharing rule and bargaining payoffs.
30In fact, this is a slightly simplified version of their utility function obtained by 
setting =  02 =  7 =  1.
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Lem m a 9 With Cournot competition between two retailers with differing 
quality levels and wholesale costs, we get the following single-market profit 
function
Proof. See Appendix. ■
6.2.2 N o private labels
We now turn to solving for an equilibrium of the model, first considering 
a situation where there is no private label present, which will serve as 
our benchmark case for comparison later. Therefore here all retailers 
source from the incumbent supplier and in equation (2 ) we have Ui = 
Uj = u s . Understanding the equilibrium levels of Wi and Wj is more 
complex however, and requires us to solve the bargaining game between 
the supplier and retailers.
Note that setting a wholesale price of zero to both retailers does not 
maximise the supplier’s profits in these markets, as it would if he were 
selling downstream to a single retailer. Instead, the supplier would be 
better off if he raised the wholesale price to both retailers which would 
serve to damped downstream competition and prevent retailers compet­
ing away industry profits. In fact, the supplier would optimally raise the 
wholesale prices to the level which induces retailers to jointly produce 
the monopoly output downstream, hence maximising the profit of the 
vertical chain at the monopoly level.
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However, it turns out that with unobservable contracts it is not pos­
sible for the supplier to raise wholesale prices to this level, instead in 
equilibrium he will sell to both at a wholesale price equal to marginal 
cost, and will fail to maximise industry profits. This opportunism prob­
lem was first discussed by Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaffer 
(1992) and McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and can be explained as fol­
lows.31
W ith any set of contracts that maximise industry profits, and there­
fore feature wholesale prices above marginal cost, there is a profitable 
bilateral deviation for the supplier and any single retailer. By reducing 
the wholesale price to a given retailer, the supplier can opportunistically 
increase their joint profit at the expense of rival retailers (who would face 
a competitor with lower production costs) and the benefits of this could 
be shared between the two firms by adjusting the fixed fee.
The outcome that results in such a situation depends crucially upon 
how retailers revise their beliefs if they receive an off-equilibrium offer 
from suppliers. We follow the majority of the literature and assume that 
retailers have "passive beliefs", that when retailers receive an unexpected
31 Several suggestions have been made for overcoming the opportunism problem. 
Hart and Tirole (1990) suggest vertical integration, bringing all of the retailers under 
the control of the supplier, while McAfee and Schwartz (1994) suggest committing 
to uniform contracts across all markets (symmetric beliefs). O ’Brien and Shaffer on 
the other hand show that vertical restraints such as closed-territory distribution and 
retail price maintainence can support the profit maximising outcome, whilst Marx and 
Shaffer (2004) show that the opportunism problem can be overcome using a menu of 
two-part tariffs. More recently, de Fontenay and Gans (2005) show that by scrapping 
the assumption that fixed fees must be paid upfront and instead allowing them to 
be paid after learning about the contractual terms of others, combined with making 
them optional and thus allowing retailers to back out of contracts, serves to remove 
the supplier’s incentive to act opportunistically.
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offer that is off the equilibrium path they do not revise their beliefs about 
the offers made to others.32 This belief structure can be argued to be the 
most intuitively appealing, as there is no reason why a retailer should 
necessarily update his beliefs following a deviating offer, and is more 
in the spirit of equilibrium theory where we generally concentrate on 
unilateral deviations.33
Therefore, in equilibrium this bilateral deviation effect we identified 
above will be taken to the extreme; each retailer will be offered a whole­
sale price equal to marginal cost to maximise the joint profit in each 
negotiation. As a result of the supplier’s inability to commit to not act­
ing opportunistically, industry profits are not maximised at the monopoly 
level.
Note that the supplier has no incentive to raise wholesale prices above 
this level as doing so reduces profits earned in negotiations with the given 
retailer, and all other retailers have equilibrium beliefs that their rivals 
are being supplied at marginal cost, which this action would do nothing 
to affect. When contracts are secret no retailer would believe a claim 
by the supplier that he is supplying a rival above marginal cost, as it is 
not the optimum pricing strategy and they cannot observe the contract 
themselves. So this means that the supplier sells to all firms at a marginal
32 For example passive beliefs are used in Segal (1999), Caprice (2006) and W hite 
(2007). Other types of beliefs have been identified; with symmetric beliefs each retailer 
believes that all other firms received the same deviating offer that it did. W ith wary 
beliefs a retailer that receives a deviating offer expects his rivals to receive offers that 
maximise the supplier’s profit, given the offer he has received.
33 Though of course, a supplier making deviating offers to several retailers simulta­
neously is still technically only a unilateral deviation.
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price of zero, with the fixed fee determined by negotiations over the profits 
earned by the given retailer.
Before solving the bargaining game to calculate payoffs we have to 
analyse the outside options of the retailers and the supplier if negotiations 
break down. Firstly we can note that all retailers have no outside option; 
since the supplier is a monopolist if they fail to contract with him they 
are forced to exit the industry as they have no alternative source of inputs 
(given that here there are no private labels).
However, the outside option of the supplier is more complex. At first 
glance one may expect him to have a positive outside option, as if nego­
tiations break down with one retailer he can expect to sell more goods 
through the other retailer in that market who becomes a monopolist. 
However, it turns out that this is not actually the case because, as ex­
plained above, we showed how both retailers are supplied in equilibrium 
at marginal cost, which means that the supplier makes no profit on any 
extra units sold.
Therefore even if negotiations with one retailer break down, and extra 
units are sold through his rival in that market, the supplier’s profits 
are fixed at the level of the fixed fee paid by this retailer, and do not 
increase with his output. This means that we can effectively treat the 
two negotiations that the supplier undertakes with retailers in the same 
market as independent, and we have that his outside option in these 
bargains is also zero.
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Looking at Lemma 9 we therefore have = w0 =  0, and u% — Uj = 
u s ■ The supplier’s profits are thus
From these profit functions we can establish the following result for 
the supplier’s optimum investment level in the benchmark case.
P ro p o sitio n  10 With no private label present, the supplier’s optimum 
level of investment is
P roof. See Appendix. ■
Here the motivation for the supplier to invest in increasing the quality 
of his product comes from a market-expansion effect; although improving 
quality cannot raise his market share, it can increase the total size of the 
market by inducing extra consumers to purchase the good.
We see that the level of this investment depends upon parameters in 
expected ways: it is increasing in the total number of markets from which 
profits can be reaped, and the strength of the supplier’s bargaining power, 
and decreases in the cost of investment. We designate this benchmark
And the chain’s profits are
47V (1 — a)
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level of investment as us because it is important in our later results.
6 .3  T h e In tro d u ctio n  o f  P r iv a te  L abels
6.3.1 P r iv a te  L abel E q u ilib riu m
Next we consider a situation where the chain store possesses a private 
label which he may sell in place of the supplier’s good, and this is of 
exogenous quality upl -34 We focus upon the key question of how does the 
introduction of a private label affect the incumbent supplier’s incentives 
to invest and innovate, and what effect does this have upon downstream 
competition and consumers?
Note that we assume that only the chain retailer possesses a private 
label, and we take the presence of this to be exogenously determined as 
our main focus is not upon this decision itself but upon its impact upon 
the incumbent supplier, investment levels, competition and the welfare of 
consumers.35 However we note that given the setup, with a large retailer 
present in several markets, an outcome where only the chain establishes 
a private label is entirely realistic; he would be better able to pay the 
costs of establishing a private label as he could spread this over more
34 Fixing the quality of one of the goods and concentrating only upon the investment 
incentives of the other is an approach that has been used before, for example in 
Bontems, Monier-Dilhan and Requillart (1999). However, they fix the quality of the 
supplier’s good and study incentives to invest in the private label, an approach which 
we argue is less interesting than studying the incentives of the incumbent supplier to 
invest as this has a direct impact upon the competitive position of smaller retailers.
35 For an analysis of the retailer’s decision to actually introduce a private label see 
Scott Morton and Zettlemeyer (2004), where the retailer must decide whether to delist 
a national brand in order to stock the own label. Also see Gabrielsen and Sprgard 
(2007) where the retailer must decide whether to grant exclusivity to the national 
brand, or introduce the private label alongside it.
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units.
We implicitly model the chain as engaging in self-production of his 
private label; he can produce it in the same manner that the incumbent 
supplier produces his goods. That is, the retailer can sell as much of 
the private label as he wishes at a marginal cost of zero. This model 
of self-production is relatively standard in the literature, for example in 
Gabrielsen and Sprgard (2007) and Sayman, Hoch and Raju (2002).
However, there is significant evidence that self-production does not 
entirely accurately reflect the reality of the manufacture of private la­
bels. While it does appear that some store brands are produced by 
the retailers themselves, and surprisingly some are produced by branded 
good producers, in practice most are produced by a competitive fringe of 
manufacturers that specialise in private label production. For example 
Berges-Sennou, Bontems and Requillart (2004) note that in the French 
dairy sector all three methods of private label production exist; all large 
dairy farms also produce private labels, several medium and small manu­
facturers specialise in private labels, and at least one retailer has its own 
production facility.
It is important to realise though that our model also effectively de­
scribes the situation when the production of a private label is outsourced 
to this fringe. Competition between these many firms for the business 
of producing the private label will result in a Bertrand outcome where 
the wholesale price they charge is pushed down to the marginal cost of
84
production, zero. Therefore, although as we proceed we talk of retailers 
producing their own private labels, our model applies much more gen­
erally to the case where the production of private labels is outsourced 
to another firm. This is similar to Bontems, Monier-Dilhan and Requi- 
llart (1999), who model the production of a private label as being by a 
competitive fringe of suppliers selling it to the retailer at marginal cost.
Recognise that here we have two different types of markets; uq mar­
kets feature the chain competing with his private label against an inde­
pendent store selling the good produced by the supplier. In the other 
TV — nc  markets the chain store is not present, and instead feature two 
independent stores both competing with the supplier’s good. To under­
stand the overall equilibrium level of supplier investment, itj, we have to 
solve for the equilibrium in both of these types of market before aggre­
gating over all of them.
The following equations are based upon an assumption that after 
establishing the private label, the chain will actually want to use it; that 
upl >  u*s . We investigate later if and when this is the case. We don’t 
assume any sort of lock-in, and the chain is free to establish the private 
label and then not actually sell it, a possibility we specifically turn our 
attention to in the next section.
In markets where the chain is present he sells his own good of quality 
upl and enjoys a production cost of zero (wpl = 0). Similarly, in those 
markets where the chain is present the incumbent supplier will contract
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with only a single retailer, and will therefore maximise the profit of the 
vertical chain by setting the marginal wholesale price equal to his pro­
duction cost, which is zero, ws = 0. Then, as in the previous section, the 
fixed fee will be set at a level which splits the profit between the supplier 
and retailer according to their bargaining power.
In those N  — nc  markets where the chain is not present the supplier 
sells to two retailers. The outcome here will be similar to the one de­
scribed above in the benchmark case with no private labels. That is, 
the opportunism problem results in both retailers being supplied at zero 
marginal cost with negotiations taking place over the fixed fee, and both 
bargains are effectively treated as being separate.
Again, before solving the bargaining game to calculate payoffs we have 
to analyse the outside options of the retailers and suppliers if negotiations 
break down. Firstly we can note that again all independent retailers 
have no outside option. Since the supplier is a monopolist, if they fail 
to contract with him they are forced to exit the industry as they have 
no alternative source of inputs. When the supplier contracts with an 
independent store facing the chain with his own private label, he too has 
no outside option; there is no alternative channel for him to use to reach 
those consumers. Also, as discussed above, even when he sells to two 
independent retailers in a market the supplier has no outside option due 
to the marginal cost pricing that prevails in equilibrium.
Summing the supplier’s share of the profits from all of the nc  markets
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where he deals with an independent store facing a chain and all of the 
(N  — n c ) markets where he deals with two independent stores facing each 
other, and taking into account investment costs, we get total supplier 
profits as
n s =  2 ( i V - n c ) ( l _ a ) ( | ) 2 +  „ c ( l - a ) ( ? ! ^ ^ ) 2 - 2 | l
We get the following expression for his first order condition, which 
pins down his optimum level of investment36
4 (JV — nc)  (1 -  a) 4nc ( l - £ * ) , „  2 ,----------- g------------Us  H---------g-------(2Us -  u PL) -  7 u s  (3)
The effect of the introduction of private labels on the investment 
incentives of the incumbent manufacturer initially appears ambiguous. 
On the one hand he has reduced incentives because of a simple numbers 
effect - he now sells to nc  fewer stores than previously, so stands to earn 
lower proceeds from investment. However, on the other hand there are 
increased incentives because in some markets there is now a business 
stealing effect; those retailers he supplies that face the chain store stand 
to gain market share if they are supplied with a higher quality product.
36 Note at first glance this first order condition may appear to not have a solution, 
as at u s  =  0 we appear to have a negative marginal benefit of investment. However, 
this is an algebraic falsehood coming from the fact that when u s  — 0 we have 2us~uc
negative, but ( 2us ~ uc  positive. As u s  rises, the term becomes less negative, hence 
the squared term becomes less positive. In actuality, when the term is negative, the 
retailer would not sell the good, would make zero profit, and hence the marginal 
benefit from this term is non-negative, combined with the non-negative other term.
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We are able to state the following about the equilibrium in this case.
P ro p o sitio n  1 1  When we have a high quality private label, upl > us, 
we have upl > u*s and therefore an equilibrium with the chain store 
selling his own store brand.
P roof. See Appendix. ■
This result means that for the range upl  > us  our earlier assumption 
that we have upl  > u*s is indeed correct, and we get the equilibrium 
presented. In this case the retailer prefers to sell his own good to that 
of the incumbent manufacturer as it is of higher quality, and therefore 
puts him at an advantage compared to the other retailers and allows him 
to earn greater profits. We can explicitly solve for the optimum level of 
investment by the incumbent manufacturer in this case
L em m a 1 2  When the chain has a high quality private label, upl >  us, 
in equilibrium he sells it and the supplier optimally invests
P roof. See Appendix. ■
So we see here that the supplier’s investment incentives have been 
reduced by the presence of the private label, we term this effect the 
forestalling effect. Because he sells his good through fewer outlets than in 
the benchmark case with no private labels, he has less of an opportunity 
to reclaim the costs of his investment.
4(- /V +nc)( l—a) , 
9
4(iV+nc)(l— a )  
9
167nc(l—a)
2 j < us  (4)
Examining this solution we can also state one corollary 
Corollary 1 u*s is decreasing in upl-
We have therefore established that the sale of private label goods un­
ambiguously reduces the incentives for the incumbent supplier to invest 
in improving his product. Moreover, the greater the quality of the private 
label, the more significant this effect is. This serves to damage the com­
petitive position of smaller independent retailers who source their inputs 
from this supplier; they now face selling a lower quality product while 
being in competition with a chain store that possesses an even higher 
quality good than previously.
This result has a similar intuition to the literature on raising rivals’ 
costs, whereby firms seek to disadvantage their rivals to improve their 
own relative competitiveness.37 This also relates to the concept of the 
waterbed effect, which is the idea that a large retailer exercising his buyer 
power to obtain discounts from his suppliers causes them to raise their 
prices to his less powerful rivals, increasing his profit still further but 
distorting downstream competition .38
More specifically, our result links into (though is still distinct from) an 
idea raised by the UK Competition Commission in their grocery market 
inquiry of a "non-price" waterbed effect.39 This argument states that as a
37For example see Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987), Sibley and Weisman (1998) 
and Banerjee and Lin (2003).
38For example see Majumdar (2006), Dobson and Inderst (2007) and Inderst and 
Valetti (2007).
39Competition Commission (2007), The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market 
Investigation, paragraph 5.38.
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large retailer uses his buyer power to obtain preferential non-price terms 
of trade, smaller retailers see a deterioration in their non-price terms. 
Here we have shown that by establishing a private label, a large retailer 
is able to damage his rivals’ non-price terms of trade, which serves to 
further improve his competitive position .40
We turn our attention to an analysis of our findings, and their impli­
cations for competition, consumers and policy later. First we examine 
the possibility of a market outcome where the chain store may optimally 
possess a private label, but not sell it in equilibrium.
6.3.2 Private Label Established but not Sold
Let us now consider the case when we have upl < us and examine if 
here there is an equilibrium where the chain store possesses a private 
label, but does not sell it in equilibrium. We would interpret this as the 
chain establishing an umbrella brand which spans several product ranges, 
and which could be introduced into the category in question should the 
retailer not receive a sufficiently generous contract from the incumbent 
supplier.41 This therefore gives him an outside option in his negotiations 
with the supplier, and allows him to secure a larger proportion of the
40Economides (1998) develops a model of the raising rivals’ costs argument that 
specifically focusses upon degrading the quality of rivals’ products.
41 The concept of an umbrella brand which reaches across several product catagories 
(sometimes referred to as "brand extension" or "reputation stretching") has featured 
in several papers, for example Wernerfelt (1988), Choi (1998) and Cabral (2000). Er- 
dem (1998) conducts an empirical analysis and finds strong support for the signalling 
theory of umbrella branding. In addition, Boston Consulting Group (2007) note that 
"large retailers have learned to create trusted ROBs [Retailer Own Brands], which 
serve as umbrella brands for their private-label offerings".
90
profits.
For such an outcome to be an equilibrium we must ultimately have 
upl < u*s so that it is actually optimum for the chain to sell the supplier’s 
good rather than his own. We assume this initially in our calculations 
and later verify that this is indeed the case.
Before we can pin down the results of the bargaining game between 
the supplier and the retailers we must once more turn our attention 
to the outside options of all parties. Again, similar to the situation 
analysed above, the fact that the opportunism problem results in retailers 
being supplied at marginal cost means that the supplier stands to make 
no increase in profit on extra units sold through a rival store, should 
negotiations with a given retailer break down. So, again we have that 
both negotiations can be treated separately, with the supplier having no 
outside option.
Here though the chain does have an outside option, as if negotiations 
break down with the supplier he can always sell his own private label 
instead. The quality of this own label is crucial in dictating how great 
this outside option is. Substitution of the relevant values into equation 
(2 ) gives us the value of the chain’s outside option as ( 2upl~us ^ 2.
Therefore the supplier’s profits as a function of his quality level is 
given by
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n s = (2N  -  n o )  (1 -  a) ( | ) 2+nc (1 -  a) [ ( f  ) 2 -
Maximising this with respect to his level of investment us  we are able 
to prove the following result
Proposition  13 When we have a low quality private label, upl < us, 
we have u*s > upl and therefore an equilibrium where it is not sold but 
is used as a threat to improve the chain’s bargaining position.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
This means that our earlier assumption of u*s > upp upon which 
our equations were predicated was in fact correct. This result tells us 
that when the quality of the private label is low it will not be sold in 
equilibrium, but is still useful for the chain retailer. By giving him an 
outside option, even if it is inferior to the supplier’s good, it allows him 
to secure a larger proportion of the industry profits.
Considering the exact level of investment that will occur in this equi­
librium, we are able to show that
Lemma 14 When the chain has a low quality private label, upl < u s , 
in equilibrium he ultimately sources off the incumbent manufacturer who 
optimally invests
7
(2N  -  nc ) + J ( 2 N  -  nc f  + f f^ U P L  
us = (1 -  « ) ------------------------ g~--------------------------> “s (5)
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P roof. See Appendix. ■
We see that here the supplier invests more than in the benchmark 
case, that the presence of the chain’s outside option actually serves to 
encourage further investment by the supplier. The logic for this result is 
that when the chain has a private label as an outside option, the supplier 
has two separate incentives to invest in improving his quality. Firstly 
there is the market-expansion incentive to invest, and this is exactly 
the same as it was in the base case when there was no threat of the 
introduction of private labels.
However, here the supplier has a second incentive to invest that he 
did not have in the benchmark case, and that is by investing more he 
reduces the value of the chain’s outside option. The chain would face 
competing against a higher quality rival downstream if he invoked his 
outside option, and so stands to make a lower level of profit the greater 
the supplier’s level of investment. Therefore the incumbent supplier will 
seek to spend more on improving his quality because of this effect, as it 
allows him to secure a larger proportion of the industry profits during 
negotiations.42
So here we have a pro-competitive effect that we term the competition 
effect; that the presence of a private label can induce the incumbent 
supplier to invest more than he would have had the chain’s store brand 
not been present.
42A similar logic of reducing the value of the buyer’s outside option is found in 
Inderst and Wey (2007b), though there investments affect marginal cost not quality.
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Of course, to some extent it seems unrealistic that a retailer will 
establish a private label and not sell it at all. However, although our pa­
per follows the majority of the literature and examines a single-product 
stocking model for the sake of clarity and ease of exposition, it is impor­
tant to remember that in reality retailers sell a whole variety of different 
goods. More generally speaking, our model could perhaps be interpreted 
as competition for the prime shelf-space within a store.
The private label equilibrium could be interpreted as the situation 
where the store’s own brand get the best location, with the supplier’s 
relegated to a lower shelf. This equilibrium, on the other hand, could 
perhaps be thought of as the supplier’s good keeping the prime selling 
space, but a private label being introduced onto the lower shelves ready 
to move up if the supplier doesn’t offer a preferential input price.
6.4 A n alysis and P o licy  Im p lica tion s
Here we examine the effect of the introduction of a private label on con­
sumers, comparing the equilibrium with them present to the benchmark 
case with no private labels. First we present a result that allows us to in­
vestigate how changes in the quality of the goods affects the total utility 
of consumers
Lemma 15 In a market with two goods with respective qualities of Ui
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and Uj, the representative consumer’s utility in equilibrium is
=  (u i +  ui f  (6 )
18 v '
P roof. See Appendix. ■
This lemma tells us that the utility in a given market is a simple 
function of the sum of the qualities of the two products. Therefore if 
the quality of one good rises and the other one falls, overall utility will 
increase if the improvement in one is greater than the decrease in the 
other.
We therefore denote the total utility of consumers in the benchmark
case as
U  =  N W '
18
We have two cases to examine; firstly when upl < us  and we have 
an equilibrium with the chain sourcing from the supplier, and secondly 
when we have upl > ug and we have the private label being sold.
6.4.1 Low q u a lity  p riv a te  labels: upl < Us
In lemma 14 we demonstrated that when a low quality private label is 
introduced it drives the incumbent supplier to invest more in his product 
than he would have if the private label had not been present; the compe­
tition effect. The logic here is that the supplier has an incentive to invest 
in order to reduce the value of the chain’s outside option. Examining
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consumer welfare in this case we can state the following result
Proposition 16 With the introduction of a low quality private label, 
upl < us, consumers earn utility
9
(2N  -  n c ) +  J ( 2 N - n c )2 + ^ u PL 
( 1 - a ) ------------------V c j
9 7
> U
Proof. See Appendix. ■
So consumers here are unambiguously better off in this situation than 
in the benchmark case when there were no private labels. The Compe­
tition Commission investigation into the UK grocery market found ev­
idence to supports this result. They recognised the argument that the 
presence of an own label can serve to spur an incumbent supplier to 
increase his level of innovation. They noted that
"Asda told us that in circumstances where the viability of 
a branded supplier was not under threat, additional compe­
tition from own-label products might be expected to drive 
higher levels of innovation . "43
Ultimately they concluded that, similar to our findings, in this situ­
ation the presence of private labels is beneficial
"We consider that the pro-competitive effects we have iden­
tified support the existence of a number of primary and sec­
43 Competition Commission (2007), The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market 
Investigation, Appendix 9.10, paragraph 39.
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ondary drivers of own-label success ... the existence of pro- 
competitive effects of own-label products is consistent with 
the trends we have observed in R&D expenditure and inno­
vation".
6.4.2 High quality private labels upl >  us
However, the implications of private labels are less benign when we move 
from a situation when their presence is only a threat to one where they 
are actually sold. Lemma 12 showed us that this leads to the incumbent 
supplier reducing his level of investment, a forestalling effect
Proposition IT With the introduction of a high quality private label, 
upl > Us, consumers earn utility
( N - n c ) (  4 ( j V + n c ) ( l - a )  . /
1872 I 9 +  y
4 ( V + n c ) ( l —a) 2 167nc (1- a )  
 9 U p L
U  (  4(7V+n('>)(l — a) , [  4(./V-|-nQ)(l — a) 16-yn,'-.(1 — a )  \
I n g  
~  18
7 £ 1 i I - + 71q ) ( 1 q 7 7 1 (^ 0:)rl/ o — 9 UP L
It is ambiguous whether the introduction of a private label leaves con­
sumers better off.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
The reason that the impact upon consumers is ambiguous here is be­
cause it is uncertain whether the decrease in the quality of the supplier’s 
good is offset by the presence of a higher quality private label. This re­
sult supports the arguments of those who criticise the growth of private
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labels as potentially damaging to the R+D incentives of suppliers and 
the competitive position of small firms.
The idea that the private labels in a market may be of higher qual­
ity than the traditional products produced by the incumbent supplier 
may at first appear unusual and potentially contrary to reality. How­
ever, commentators have recent come to recognise that this is indeed a 
possibility.
Examining those small manufacturers that act as specialist private 
label producers supplying retailers with their own products, Boston Con­
sulting Group (2007) notes that
"as suppliers of private-label products consolidate ... they are 
gaining their own momentum in terms of increased scale and 
capabilities".
They then go on to explicitly comment on the ability of these private 
label manufacturers to produce higher quality goods, commenting that
"The most sophisticated ROB [Retailer Own Brand] players 
are beginning to ... out-innovate branded manufacturers"
We can state one final result about the effect of the introduction of 
private labels on another issue that has been of concern for policy makers, 
the profitability of independent retailers
Proposition 18 I f  private labels are sold in equilibrium, independent 
retailers earn (weakly) lower profits than in the benchmark case
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P roof. See Appendix. ■
In those markets where the independent stores compete against the 
chain, they sell a lower quality good than previously, and come up against 
a rival with an even higher quality product than before, so clearly stand 
to lose profits. Even in those markets where the chain store is not present, 
the independent retailers still stand to lose out. Although they still have 
the same relative quality, it has fallen compared to the benchmark case 
and so there is a market contraction effect: fewer consumers buy the 
product than before and so both retailers are worse off.
We can also note that this effect gets stronger the greater the quality 
of the private label. If the chain retailer introduces a very high quality 
store brand this will, by Corollary 1 , mean that the supplier will reduce 
his investment by a significant amount, severely reducing the profits of 
the independent retailers.
Although we don’t explicitly model fixed costs and therefore the pos­
sibility that a retailer may wish to exit the market, intuitively one can 
see that this result could imply such an outcome in practice. Smaller 
retailers could stand to see their profits reduced to such a degree that 
they are unable to cover their overheads and choose to exit, allowing the 
chain store to gain control of the market; an outcome that is clearly of 
significant concern to competition authorities.
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6.5  C onclu sion s
Private labels are an increasingly important market segment for firms 
worldwide, yet the implications of their growth are not fully understood 
by economists. Fears have been raised by competition authorities that 
their development could potentially have a range of anti-competitive im­
plications, particularly that they could reduce the incentives for suppliers 
to invest in improving their products.
We have created a model to allow us to formalise these arguments 
and examine if there is any grounding to these fears. Our model featured 
a supplier choosing how much to invest in improving his product quality 
- a term we give a wide interpretation to - both when a chain retailer 
possesses a private label, and when he doesn’t.
Contrary to much existing thinking, we illustrate a possible beneficial 
effect of the introduction of private labels. We demonstrated that their 
introduction into a market could actually spur the supplier to increase 
his level of investment, a phenomenon we termed the competition effect 
to reflect the fact that the incumbent producer must now improve his 
product to compete with the private label. We showed how this process 
can make consumers better off, as they benefit from the non-price com­
petition which results in higher quality products.
We further discussed how our results are in line with the findings of 
the UK Competition Commission grocery market inquiry. They noted 
increasing levels of innovation taking place across a whole range of prod­
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uct categories, and specifically associated this with the pro-competitive 
effects of private labels.
However, we also demonstrated that the fears of competition author­
ities could potentially be well-founded by illustrating a possible fore­
stalling effect of private labels, which could result in suppliers optimally 
reducing their investment below the level prevailing without their pres­
ence. We note that the effect of this on consumers is actually ambiguous, 
as the higher quality of the private label could potentially offset the lower 
quality of the supplier’s good.
Ultimately, therefore, there can be no prior assumption as to the 
nature of the competitive impact of private label goods. Instead we ar­
gue that regulators must keep an open mind and use a rule-of-reason 
approach; they should be aware of all the potential impacts of the intro­
duction of these goods, and ensure that their assessments are evidence- 
led.
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6 .6  A p p en d ix
6.6.1 P roof of Lemma 9
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6.6.2 P roof of Proposition 10
Optimising with respect to us
d lls  AN (1 — a) (u s  
dus  3 (t ) -  = 0
Give us the solution
~ *Uq —
AN ( I - a )  
9 7
Note we do also get another solution to this equation, namely us = 0. 
However, if we check the second order conditions we can note that
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Substituting in u*s = 4N^  to this equation gives us
d2Hs (  47V ( 1  — a) \  47V ( 1  — a) 47V ( 1 - a) 47V ( 1 - a)
us = ----    = --------  2 q- -du2s  \  9 7  J 9 9 7  9
So this value is a maximum point, and so represents a solution. On 
the other hand if we substitute us = 0  into the second order condition 
we get
d2Us  , n. 47V (1 — a) n
So this point represents a minimum, and is not a solution.
6.6.3 P roof of Proposition 11
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. We 
have already examined the behaviour of the consumer and calculated the 
chain’s profit function; the following is a rearrangement of the supplier’s 
first order condition for his level of investment given in equation (3)
47V (1 — a) 4nc ( l - a )  2
 g us  +  {us uPL)   -------- =  7  us
Compare this to his first order condition in the base case without 
private labels, which gave us an equilibrium of us  via the equation
We can see that if we have u pl~ us = 0 the extra term will disappear, 
and the first order conditions will be the same. So therefore we have
U p l  =  u s  = >  u*s  = u s  (7)
In which case we will have the quality of both goods being the same. 
We can then see that the supplier has lower incentives to invest than in 
the base case if the quality of the private label is greater than u s • That 
is we have
U p l  >  U s  = >  U*s  <  U s  ( 8 )
Therefore we have that
u p l  >  u s  = >  U p l  >  u*s
Therefore, with a high quality private label we have a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium where the retailer sells his own label as it of higher 
quality than the supplier’s product.
6.6.4 P roof of Lemma 12
Again we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game; 
taking into account the consumer’s behaviour we have the following re-
arrangement of the supplier’s first order condition
47V (1 — a) 4nc (1 — a) / n 9
 9 U s ----------9------ (“Pi _
4 (N  +  ric) (1 -  a) 4 n c ( l  —a) 2
------------------   u s --------------------  U P L  =  7 U 5
2 4 (A/- +  ric) (1 — at) 4nc ( l - a )  n
7 % --------------   us + --------  uPL = 0
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4 (J V + n c ) ( l—ct) -  47 4=£§=2i «i.L
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Which gives us the following subgame perfect Nash equilibrium level 
of investment
XLq —
4(jV+nc ) ( l— a ) 4 ( W + n c ) ( l — a)  
9
2
27
Furthermore, the fact that we have u*s < us  directly follows from 
equations (7) and (8 ).
6.6.5 P roof of Proposition 13
We show that for upl < us  that we have a subgame perfect Nash equi­
librium with u*s > us , which thereby implies upl < u*s and therefore the 
chain sells the supplier’s good as it is of higher quality than his own.
We can investigate whether in equilibrium u*s > us  simply by looking
105
at the first order conditions in this case compared to the benchmark case 
analysed earlier when there were no private labels. In particular, since 
the investment costs are the same in both circumstances we need only 
look at the benefits of investment in both cases. We have u*s > us  when
First recognise that we restrict out attention to the case where we 
have upl > -y-, so that the private label is actually a meaningful outside 
option, otherwise it is effectively not present.
We can clearly see from this that we get u*s > us as the incentives to 
invest are greater here than in the benchmark. When the chain has this 
outside option the supplier has the same market-expansion incentive to 
invest as in the benchmark case, but also an additional incentive which
2 (27V — n c )  (1 — op 
3
47V ( 1 -  a )  
>  3
Which we can rewrite as
2 (27V — n c ) (1 — a )  
9
106
comes from reducing the value of the chain’s private label.
Therefore we can unambiguously say that we have Upl < u s , we 
have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with u*s  > upp, by possessing 
the private label the chain improves his outside option, but ultimately 
sources the good from the supplier.
6.6.6 P roof of Lemma 14
Maximising the supplier’s profit function with respect to his level of in­
vestment
d l l s  _  2 (2N  — n c ) (1 — o l) 
Duq 3
f Us\  , ^ \ I"2 f Us\  ,  ^ ( 2up l
v i z  c ( ) .3 +  H — i
-  Us
9'V'lic
( 2 N  -  nc ) (1 -  a) us +  nc  (1 -  ol )  [ u s  +  ( 2 uPL -  u s )] =  — —
( 2 N  — nc) us  +  2uPLnc  =  0 J  S .
2 (1 - a )
Note here that we can clearly observe that this equation has a solu­
tion. When us = 0, we have the left hand side being greater, due to the 
presence of the upp term, whilst as us becomes very large the squared 
term dominates giving us a greater term on the right hand side; there 
must therefore be a crossing point where the two sides are equal.
107
- j u 2s = 0
97  . 2
2 (1 - a )
Using the quadratic formula we get
us — (2N — Tic) Us — 2 U p l 71c  =  0
(2 N  -  nc ) ±  J ( 2 N  -  n c ) 2 -  4 ^ y  ( - 2 UpLnc ) 
u *s = -------------------------5 - 9 -^--------------------------
Z 2 ( l - a )
We now clearly only have one solution, the positive one, as the nega­
tive solution would give us a quality level below zero. We therefore have 
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium level of investment of
(21V -  nc ) + J ( 2 N  -  nc f  + f ^ u PL 
u s  =  (J -  « ) ---------------------------- ^ ----------------------------
The fact that we have u*s > u follows directly from equation (9).
6.6.7 P ro o f  of L em m a 15
We have the following utility function for the representative consumer
+ n  U  =  m q i  +  U j q , -----------     -  P iqi -  P jq j
We need to put this in terms of just Ui and u3 by substituting in 
equilibrium levels for quantities and prices as a function of these quality 
levels.
The inverse demand curve is
Pi  =  U i - q i -  qj
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So substituting in this for prices gives us the consumer’s utility as a 
function of the quality of the goods and quantities
Q i + ^ Q i Q j  +  Qj  , 2 , , 2  ,U =  +  u3q3    utqt +  q% +  qiq3 -  u3q3 +  q3 +  q3ql
u  _  2 g? +  M iQj +  2 g? -  (qf +  2qiqj +  qf)
v  =  ot +  ZQiQj +  q]
v  =  { Q i  +  Q j ) ‘
We showed previously in our proof of lemma (9) that the equilibrium 
quantity sold is
_  2 (ui -  Wi) -  (u3 -  w3) 
Qi  o
2  Ui — Uj
Qi =  o ---------
Substituting this into our utility function therefore gives us
( 2u{—Uj | 2 Uj—Ui\^
U =
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And therefore we have the required result, tha t the utility in a market 
is a function of the sum of the qualities of the two products.
j j  _  iui ~f~ uj)
18
6.6.8 P roof of Proposition  16
When private labels are established but not sold, then in all markets 
both retailers sell the supplier’s good and we have Ui =  Uj = u*s . We 
can calculate U by substituting u*s from equation (5) into equation (6 ). 
The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that u*s > us as 
established in Lemma 14.
6.6.9 P roof of Proposition 17
By substitution of u*s from equation (4) into equation (6 ).
6.6.10 P roof of Proposition 18
Here we have that an independent retailer i earns a profit of
( 2 u i - U j \ 2
n ‘ = H ~ ^ J
This profit is clearly increasing in his own quality, and decreasing in 
his rival’s quality, as would be expected. In the benchmark case we had
U i U j U g
110
So independent retailers earned a profit of
Ili =  a  ( j
Here, with the chain establishing and selling a private label, we know 
from Lemma 12 that we have u*s < u s . We have two different cases to 
examine; first let us look at those markets where the chain is not present. 
We now have independent retailers earning a profit of
2Ui
Which is clearly (weakly) lower than the profits they earned previ­
ously, because their common quality level has decreased.
In those markets where the independent retailers face the chain the 
decrease in profits is even more pronounced, they now earn
/ g y <  / g s - 2
They now compete with a lower quality level, u*s , against a rival with 
a higher quality level, upl , so earn (weakly) lower profits than before.
I l l
7 Private Labels and The Countervailing 
Buyer Power Merger Defence
7.1 In trod u ction
The term countervailing power was coined by Galbraith (1952), who 
introduced the idea that powerful retailers can act as a counterbalancing 
force against the market power of sellers, and can extract lower prices 
from them. The idea was widely dismissed at the time, and in the decades 
since economists have overwhelmingly focussed their interests upon the 
role of sellers in markets, rather than buyers.
However, more recently attention has returned to the treatment of the 
role of buyers in markets, partially driven by the development of huge 
retail chains, whose growth has raised significant questions for antitrust 
practitioners, who frequently disagree on how to approach these issues. 
Economists have begun to examine in detail the conditions under which 
buyer power is likely to exist, and its likely effects on both the upstream 
and downstream markets.
The focus of this paper is particularly upon the use of buyer power as 
a merger defence in competition cases. This can take two forms, firstly 
buyer power can be used as an efficiency defence in downstream merger 
cases. That is, the parties can argue that the merger will create buyer 
power and that this is a good thing as it will allow them to obtain lower 
prices from their suppliers, which will feed through into lower prices,
112
higher output, and increased welfare.
The second way that buyer power can be used as a merger defence is 
through the idea of countervailing power, and this is the idea we focus 
upon in this paper. This is used in upstream merger cases, and the argu­
ment is that if there (already) exists buyer power downstream this will 
counteract any increase in upstream market power, leaving the merged 
firm unable to raise prices. Countervailing buyer power has long been 
recognised by antitrust authorities around the world as an important 
argument for allowing an otherwise problematic merger between two up­
stream suppliers of a good to go ahead, and has been the key argument 
in several significant cases.
This argument has, however, received relatively little attention from 
economists; Davis and Wilson (2006) note that "The effects of counter­
vailing buyer power are not well understood either theoretically or empir­
ically". The notable exception is Inderst and Shaffer (2007b) who provide 
an overview of the use of buyer power as a merger defence; particularly 
they examine the key factors that need to be considered when using the 
countervailing power argument, and discuss its use in practice. However, 
to our knowledge, there has been no research by academics to inform the 
debate amongst practitioners by examining the argument formally which 
could shed light upon the key factors that must be considered and the 
conditions under which the argument stands up to scrutiny.
In this paper we do just that, and in doing so we model a new effect;
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we show that following an upstream merger in an industry faced with a 
buyer that is able to successfully exercise countervailing power, compe­
tition downstream can still be reduced and prices to consumers can still 
rise. The point we illustrate is that, although incumbent retailers may 
be powerful and may be able to prevent increases in wholesale prices fol­
lowing a merger, any potential entrant that did enter downstream (and 
who would thus likely be smaller and not possess the same degree of 
countervailing power) would be affected by higher input prices following 
the merger. Therefore, although the merger upstream would not result 
in higher wholesale prices in the industry, it would serve to create a bar­
rier to entry to firms entering downstream .44 Any firm considering entry 
at the retail level knows that, following the merger, the input price it 
would receive would be significantly higher than it would have obtained 
previously; this then makes entry less profitable and thus less likely.
We then take the analysis one step further and argue that if the down­
stream market is a contestable one, that the pricing of the monopolist is 
constrained by the threat of entry, the price charged to consumers will 
rise following the merger. The reduced threat of entry, following from 
the higher input price the entrant would receive upon entry, has served 
to weaken the constraint upon the monopolist’s pricing, and allowed him 
to increase it closer to the monopoly level.
Note that such an idea, of potential entrants operating at a cost
44 Similarly, Innes (2006) shows how a non-horizontal merger can create a barrier 
to entry.
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disadvantage acting as a barrier to entry, has been specifically recognised 
by the UK competition authorities. Competition Commission (2007) 
states that "retailers may gain a cost advantage over their competitors, 
that can act as a barrier to entry or expansion, by purchasing goods 
from suppliers at lower prices." Interestingly, they also recognise that 
incumbent firms may price to just deter entry, and thus that the price of a 
potential entrant can therefore be key in determining the prevailing price 
in a market: "In the case of a single grocery retailer with a significant 
cost advantage, this might allow it to maintain prices above its average 
cost, but just below the prices of any potential entrant." 45
We then proceed to analyse an alternative setup where we show that 
some mergers which occur in the apparent absence of countervailing buyer 
power can actually still be defended using this argument. The intuition 
runs as follows; when pricing is constrained by the threat of entry the 
key factor that determines the retail price is not the level of costs of 
the incumbent firm, but those of the potential entrant. Therefore, if 
the potential entrant has countervailing power, so his costs and thus 
his threat of entry are unchanged following the merger, the incumbent 
retailer is unable to raise his price even if his costs do go up. Thus 
such mergers, which initially appear to be troubling because of the lack 
of apparent countervailing power, will not result in any increase in retail 
price and can be safely allowed to proceed by the competition authorities.
45Paragraphs 6.29 and 6.16; Competition Commission (2007), The Supply of Gro­
ceries in the UK market investigation: Provisional findings report.
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We choose to model buyer power as the incumbent retailer possessing 
a private label good which the potential entrant does not, and this serves 
to increase his range of options for sourcing his inputs, which improves his 
bargaining position. This is another contribution of our paper; private la­
bels are an increasingly important element of grocery markets worldwide, 
and have received insufficient attention from economists. Here we throw 
light upon this important aspect of the relationship between suppliers 
and retailers, and in particularly demonstrate their role as a potential 
source of buyer power.
However, it is important to realise that the effect we demonstrate 
doesn’t rely upon the presence of private labels. Rather, it applies no 
matter what the source of the buyer power; it could also be the potential 
to integrate backwards, to cover the fixed cost of switching to an alternate 
supplier, or to sponsor upstream entry. All that is necessary to generate 
our results is that any rival retailer, upon entry, would not possess the 
buyer power of the incumbent, and would thus be exposed to higher input 
prices.
Also observe that this result does not rely upon an assumption of lin­
ear tariffs; that the entrant will be less competitive following the merger 
because his unit costs will be higher. Instead, this result can arise even 
when the entrant’s post-entry competitiveness is unaffected, for example 
with an increase in the fixed fee for two-part tariffs with the unit price 
unchanged. The intuition is that what matters is that there is some
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price rise, not the nature of the increase; the reduced profitability of en­
try  means the potential entrant is less likely to recover his entry costs, 
and thus to enter in the first place. The fact that our results are robust 
to the nature of contracting between suppliers and retailers is unusual in 
the literature; most work relies upon a particular assumption that firms 
use either linear or two-part tariffs. This again serves to demonstrate the 
strength and widespread applicability of our results.
We therefore conclude that the use of the countervailing buyer power 
merger defence is more complex than previously thought. Antitrust au­
thorities should be more sceptical of any merger defence based upon such 
countervailing power, as a merger which appears to raise no competitive 
concerns due to the presence of such power can still result in anticom­
petitive effects and higher retail prices to consumers. On the other hand, 
we demonstrate how some mergers which may appear problematic may 
not actually result in a substantial lessening of competition through an 
innovative application of the countervailing power idea to potential en­
trants. These results suggest that when this argument is used in a merger 
case practitioners must pay attention to the role of entry in constraining 
pricing in the retail market, and the ability of any potential entrants to 
similarly exercise countervailing power over the merged entity.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present 
the basic model, where we highlight this new effect of countervailing 
power being unable to prevent a merger creating a barrier to entry. In
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Section 3 we generalise the model to bargaining between suppliers and 
retailers, obtaining interesting new insights. In Section 4 we discuss an 
extension of the model where we show that even if countervailing power 
is not present it can potentially still be used as a merger defence. In 
Section 5 we examine the existing treatment of the countervailing power 
defence by antitrust authorities and highlight some cases where it has 
been decisive, and then present recommendations for policy makers on 
how this argument should be dealt with in practice. In section 6  we 
conclude.
7.2 T h e B asic  M o d el
We have three upstream suppliers; Si and S 2 both produce a branded 
good, while S 3 (who could represent a competitive fringe) produces an 
unbranded good. All three suppliers can produce at a constant marginal 
cost of c, and consumers will only purchase branded goods from retail­
ers.46 Competition between suppliers takes the form of simultaneous 
take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to the retailer(s), we make no assump­
tions about the type of contracts used; for example they may either be 
a linear tariff W{, or a two-part tariff (tu*, r * ).47
46 Such an assumption is confirmed by a casual observation of shopping patterns. 
This can be understood as consumers desiring a brand to reassure them of a product’s 
quality; several recent scares about the safety of Chinese products have brought this 
issue back to the headlines.
47 Many of the results obtained in the buyer power literature depend crucially upon 
the type of contracts used; on the other hand our results are very general and work 
for any type of contractual form. There is limited and mixed evidence on what type  
of contracts are used by firms in practice; Smith and Thanassoulis (2006) examined 
the UK market for milk and found support for linear tariffs, noting that firms use a
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Downstream we have one incumbent monopolist R i, there is also 
one potential entrant R 2 who can enter the industry at a sunk cost of 
F. Denoting monopoly profits in the downstream industry as IIM, we 
assume that IIM > F  > 0.48 We further assume that the incumbent 
retailer R\ has some buyer power over the suppliers; here we model this 
as him possessing a private label. A private label, or own-brand, is a good 
where the product is branded by the retailer and not by the supplier; 
these products have become increasingly important in economies world­
wide.49 For example their market penetration in grocery markets now 
stands at around 18% in the US, 28% in Germany and about 40% in the 
UK .50
We assume that R\ can use his private label to sell the unbranded 
good produced by S 3 no different to as if he were selling the goods of the 
other suppliers. R 2 does not have this private label and thus, if he enters, 
he is unable to sell S^s good. Downstream competition takes place in 
prices, and we assume the retailer(s) face a generalised inverse market 
demand curve P(Q) with the standard assumption that P'{Q) < 0 .
We consider the impact of a merger between S\ and S 2 upon the down­
simple per-unit price with no fixed fee element. On the other hand, Bonnet, Dubois 
and Simioni (2006) study the bottled water market in France and find evidence for 
non-linear tariffs, particularly two-part tariffs.
48The assumption that IIM > F  ensures that the threat of entry by R 2 is credible; 
otherwise he could never profitably enter.
49Berges-Sennou, Bontems and Requillart (2004) provide a survey of the literature 
on private labels. Scott Morton and Zettlemeyer (2004) and Gabrielsen and Sprgard 
(2007) present models which attempt to explain why retailers may want to introduce 
private labels.
50 See Boston Consulting Group (2007).
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stream industry and consumer welfare.51 The key question is whether 
the countervailing buyer power possessed by the incumbent monopolist 
downstream is sufficient to prevent the exercise of market power by the 
merged entity, an increase in retail prices and thus ultimately a reduction 
of overall welfare following the merger.
The timing of the game is as follows:
• In stage 1, all suppliers make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it con­
tract offers to the incumbent retailer, R\.
•  In stage 2 , Ri chooses which of these offers (if any) to accept. He 
then sets his retail price to consumers, Pi.
• In stage 3, the potential entrant R 2 decides if to pay a sunk cost F  
to enter the market
•  In stage 4, if R 2 has entered then the branded suppliers make si­
multaneous take-it-or-leave-it contract offers to him. Note that the 
unbranded supplier makes no effective offer to the entrant, as since 
he lacks a private label R 2 is unable to sell these goods.
•  In stage 5, if R 2 has entered he chooses which offer to accept from 
those offered by the branded suppliers (if any), and then sets his 
retail price P2.
51 Since our focus in not on the decision to merge itself, but on its effect upon 
the downstream market and retail prices, we simply take this merger decision to 
be exogenous and don’t concern ourselves with whether it is actually profitable. A 
whole literature on exogenous merger models exists, starting with Salant, Switzer and 
Reynolds (1983) and followed by Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990). Kamien and Zang (1990) develop a model with endogenous mergers, and 
Gowrisankaran (1999) presents a model that is both endogenous and dynamic.
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Although we use take-it-or-leave-it offers from the suppliers here in 
the basic model our results do not depend critically upon this assumption, 
later we relax this and examine a more generalised bargaining framework. 
The main point to note here is our sequential framework, that prices are 
set by the incumbent and then a potential entrant makes an entry and 
pricing decision.
This formulation follows the literature on contestable markets, de­
veloped in Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), which assumes that in­
cumbent retailers are vulnerable to "hit and run" entry, where entrants 
can undercut their prices and steal business without them being able to 
respond for some period of time. This threat of losing business to en­
trants then disciplines incumbent firms to price at competitive levels; in 
a perfectly contestable market where entry is entirely costless even an 
incumbent monopolist is forced to price at the competitive level.
Criticisms of this theory have focussed upon the fact that after entry 
occurs the incumbent retailer would immediately respond to the entry 
by reducing price. This in turn would mean the entrant would earn zero 
profits (should competition be in prices) and thus he would be unable to 
recover even extremely small costs of entry, so entry would never happen 
. Therefore, the critics allege, pre-entry prices provide no guide to post­
entry prices, and thus it is not possible for an incumbent firm to price to 
deter entry.
However, if for example there is some degree of price stickiness on
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the part of the incumbent retailer he will not be able to respond to 
the incumbent’s undercutting price for some time. This price stickiness 
would serve to make the market contestable, and therefore again means 
the threat of entry can influence the incumbent’s pre-entry pricing .52 
Note that we don’t make the extreme assumption of perfectly contestable 
markets, but simply the more relaxed and generalised assumption that 
entry can take place at sunk cost F.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the use of contestable 
markets theory is not actually necessary for the essential result in our 
paper, which is that a merger can still be anti-competitive even with ap­
parently effective countervailing power, because of the fact that it creates 
a barrier to entry downstream. The use of a contestable downstream mar­
ket is simply a means to model directly the impact of this barrier upon 
the downstream market and highlight its anti-competitive nature.
7.2.1 Pre-M erger Equilibrium
Let us first consider the situation prior to the merger between the two 
suppliers. The incumbent retailer benefits from competition between all 
three suppliers and gets offered a linear price of
52 See also Milgrom and Roberts (1982) who consider a game of incomplete infor­
mation, where the incumbent’s choice of price pre-entry can signal something about 
the profitability of entry. The incumbent can possibly then deter entry by pricing 
lower than otherwise, in order to falsely signal that the market is not as profitable as 
it actually is. Therefore, this framework also provides a motivation for the threat of 
entry to constrain pre-enty pricing.
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*w1 = c
Note that this outcome occurs whether we assume suppliers use two- 
part tariffs or linear tariffs. W ith linear tariffs the wholesale price will be 
pushed down to marginal cost through a process of Bertrand competition 
between the three suppliers. With two-part tariffs the wholesale price will 
always be set to marginal cost c to maximise the profit of the vertical 
chain, Bertrand competition will then occur with respect to the fixed fee 
Tn that each supplier Si offers R\ and we will end up with (wn,Tn) =
M ) .
Similarly, if R 2 does enter he too will benefit from competition be­
tween the two branded retailers (but not the unbranded retailer, whose 
good he is unable to stock), and will be offered the same contract
w*2 =  c
Upon entering, R 2 s optimal strategy would be to minimally undercut 
Ri by charging P2* — Pi ~  ?• We consider the limiting case, where
p ;  =  P i
Here the incumbent retailer will make zero profits, therefore R i has 
an incentive to price so as to deter entry in the first place. In the absence 
of the threat of entry, the incumbent retailer would charge the monopoly
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price
P M argmax(Pi — c)Q(Pi)
This gives us our first interesting result
Lem m a 19 i ?2 will enter if  Pi > P*; where P* is defined implicitly by 
the minimum value that satisfies (P* — c) Q(P*) = F .
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Following on from this, we can now find a second result for the pre­
merger equilibrium.
Lemma 20 The incumbent retailer will set Pi = P* in equilibrium to 
deter entry, where P M > P* > c.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Note that entry never occurs in equilibrium, though the threat of 
entry plays a key role in determining the equilibrium outcome. Having 
solved for the pre-merger situation we will now proceed to examine the 
post-merger outcome, and will compare the results found in Lemmas 19 
and 2 0  to the outcome following the concentration.
7.2.2 Post-M erger Equilibrium
Examining the post-merger situation we get one immediate result.
Lemma 21 Countervailing buyer power has prevented the wholesale price 
to the incumbent retailer rising, we still have w\ = c.
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Proof. See Appendix. ■
Examining what happens following entry, we see that as previously if 
R 2 enters he will set a price to just marginally undercut the incumbent 
retailer
p ;  =  p 1
However, despite the result of Lemma 21 when we come to analyse 
the entry decision of R 2 we find that the merger has indeed had an 
anticompetitive effect.
Proposition 22 The merger creates a barrier to entry
Proof. See Appendix. ■
The intuition for this result is that after the merger R 2 would upon 
entry face a monopoly input supplier who will be able to extract all of 
his profits after entry. The entrant would therefore be unable to recoup 
any costs incurred in entering, and so he would never choose to do so.
Thus we have established a key point, that countervailing buyer power 
on its own is not sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects resulting 
from the merger. Although the incumbent firm is able to use his coun­
tervailing power to keep his input prices down, any potential entrant 
without the same power is unable to do this; therefore the merger has 
resulted in a barrier to entry and the potential competitor is less likely 
to enter the industry post-merger.
Note that the barrier to entry does not come from the reduced com­
petitiveness of the entrant per se; although we focussed upon linear pric­
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ing we also noted that using two-part tariffs the merger can simply result 
in a higher fixed fee to R 2 , leaving him equally competitive. Rather, the 
barrier to entry comes from the fact that entry is less profitable than it 
was previously and thus the potential entrant is less likely to recover his 
costs of entry.
Competition authorities should attempt to avoid such an outcome be­
cause barriers to entry are generally always anticompetitive; by restrict­
ing competition they convey increased market power upon incumbent 
firms, a point we illustrate in our next result.
Proposition 23 The merger leads to higher retail prices; the (super­
ficially successful) countervailing buyer power is insufficient to prevent 
this.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Note that the countervailing power has not failed in a narrowly defined 
sense, by lemma (2 1 ) we see that it has prevented wholesale prices to the 
incumbent firm increasing. The reason it has failed is because preventing 
wholesale prices rising is insufficient to guarantee no increase in retail 
prices. In this setup we see that the major factor determining retail 
prices is not the retailer’s costs, but the competitive constraint imposed 
by the potential entrant. Therefore, as the merger serves to weaken this 
constraint retail prices will rise even in the absence of an increase in 
costs. This strictly reduces overall welfare as there has been an increase 
in deadweight loss; those consumers that strictly preferred to purchase
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at the old price, but choose not to at the new monopoly price, are worse 
off.
It should also be recognised that although the above result concen­
trates upon perhaps the simplest and often most important variable in 
a market, the price, the barrier to entry the merger creates can have 
additional negative effects. For example, in addition to the simple static 
effects demonstrated above there may also be some additional conse­
quences if we consider the market in a dynamic setting; for example the 
reduced competitive constraints that result from the barrier to entry can 
weaken incentives for incumbent firms to invest in improving product 
quality and consumer choice over time.
7.3 A  B arga in in g  M od el
Our basic model demonstrated our key insight, that countervailing buyer 
power may be insufficient to prevent anti-competitive effects arising as 
a result of an upstream merger. To simplify the exposition we assumed 
that suppliers made take-it-or-leave-it offers to retailers; we now relax 
that assumption and instead have suppliers and retailers bargaining over 
their contracts.
We use the standard Nash bargaining solution, and set the exogenous 
bargaining power of retailers equal to a. We thus endogenise the bar­
gaining outcome through an analysis of outside-options, with this rule 
dictating how any incremental surplus above the sum of the outside-
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options of the two parties is split between them.
To analyse the bargaining outcome it is now necessary that we are 
more precise about the types of contracts used by firms. We solve for 
the two standard cases in the literature: linear tariffs (the simplest form 
of contract), and two-part tariffs (the simplest form of contract that 
overcomes double marginalisation and allows the setting of the marginal 
wholesale price and the distribution of profits to be done separately).
7.3.1 Two-Part and Linear Tariffs
First let us proceed by analysing the case when suppliers and retailers 
contract using two-part tariffs. As noted previously, the marginal whole­
sale price will always be set at Wij =  c so as to maximise the profit of the 
vertical chain. The bargaining will take place over the fixed fee, which 
will determine the distribution of profits between suppliers and retailers.
Firstly, let us recognise that the pre-merger situation will be no dif­
ferent with bargaining. Both the incumbent retailer, and R 2 should he 
decide to enter, benefit from the possibility of sourcing off at least two 
perfectly substitutable suppliers. They therefore have a full outside- 
option, and thus still take all of the profits from the contract by paying 
no fixed fee. That is, there is no surplus to be split by the sharing rule.
Post-merger, the same is true for the incumbent retailer, he is still 
able to source from the competitive fringe and thus still has a full outside- 
option and pays no fixed fee. However this is not true for the potential 
entrant, should he decide to become active in the industry he will now
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only be able to source off the merged entity S i+2  and thus the surplus 
will be split according to the sharing rule. We get the following result
Lem m a 24 I f  two-part tariffs are used and firms bargain over contracts, 
upon entry R 2 earns a flow profit o fUn2 =  cH I^ P i).
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Now let us proceed to consider the case of linear tariffs; this case is 
generally more complex to analyse as changes in the tariff usually lead to 
changes in output and prices, which serves to alter the size of the surplus 
the parties are splitting .53 Notice that as recognised above for two-part 
tariffs, with linear tariffs both retailers in the pre-merger situation, and 
for the incumbent in the post merger situation, the situation is unchanged 
using bargaining compared to the analysis in the basic model. However, 
again if R 2 enters introducing bargaining will alter the distribution of 
profits. We show the following
Lemma 25 I f  linear tariffs are used and firms bargain over contracts, 
upon entry R 2 earns a flow profit ofHR2 = aJI^fPi), the same as when 
two-part tariffs are used.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
53Dobson and Waterson (2007) illustrate how to solve a complex bargaining problem 
with linear tariffs.
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7.3.2 Entry and Pricing
Lemmas 24 and 25 showed that, irrespective of whether two-part or linear 
tariffs are used, R 2 would upon entry earn a flow profit of a l l ^  (Pi). We 
therefore get the following result
Proposition  26 With bargaining the merger has again created a barrier 
to entry; R 2 will now only enter if Ufa (Pi) >
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Note that pre-merger R 2 would have entered if U fa(Pi) > P , so 
the entry condition is now weaker. The incumbent firm will have to 
be charging a higher price, and earning greater profits, to attract entry. 
Note that the barrier to entry is greater (that is, the entry condition 
weakens more) the smaller the retailer’s exogenous bargaining power. 
This makes intuitive sense as since he stands to make a smaller proportion 
of whatever profits are available, that level would have to be higher to 
attract him into the industry.
Now examining the pricing decision of the incumbent retailer, we 
again find that he will wish to price to just deter entry. We get that
Proposition 27 With bargaining the merger results in the incumbent 
retailer pricing such that 11^ (Pi) =  min {P, IIM}.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
So generally we have that the merger has again resulted, through the 
barrier to entry effect, in a higher retail price in the downstream market;
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note again that this result does not depend crucially upon assumptions 
regarding the nature of contracting. Recognise in particular that the 
weaker retailers are in bargaining with their suppliers (i.e. the smaller 
a ) , the greater the rise in price the concentration results in.
W ith Q =  0w e are back to the case we examined in the basic model, 
where suppliers could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to retailers, and the 
merger resulted in the price rising to the monopoly level. We get one 
corollary from this result
Corollary 2 Countervailing buyer power is only an entirely effective 
merger defence here if the retailers have all the bargaining power in their 
negotiations with suppliers, which corresponds to a  = 1; retailers making 
take-it-or-leave-it offers.
So, here the only time that the countervailing power defence stands 
up to scrutiny is if retailers have all of the bargaining power, that is 
they take all of the incremental surplus from their negotiations with 
suppliers. Here a reduction in competition between suppliers doesn’t 
affect the potential entrant, as the input price he obtains is unaffected 
by the degree of competition upstream.
7.4  A n  A ltern a tiv e  M od el
In the basic model presented above we demonstrated a limitation of the 
countervailing buyer power merger defence, showing that even when the 
incumbent retailer possesses buyer power and is able to use it to prevent
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an increase in his wholesale price following the merger, the concentration 
can still lead to higher retail prices.
Now we turn to another example and find an unexpected application 
of the argument. We show that even if an incumbent firm possesses no 
buyer power, and is unable to prevent an increase in his wholesale price 
following the merger, this defence can still be used to argue that the 
retail price will not rise and that the merger should be allowed.
Consider a setup similar to the one examined previously, but now 
assume that the incumbent retailer R\ possesses no buyer power, but the 
potential entrant R 2 does; again in the form of a private label good that 
allows him to source off the competitive fringe of unbranded goods. Such 
a case is entirely possible; for example when the potential entrants to 
an industry are very large firms active in retailing a wide range of other 
products to consumers, and who have invested large sums of money over 
time to build up a strong brand image. These retailers will be able to 
enter the industry and sell unbranded goods sourced from the competitive 
fringe under their own brand name, which they will likely have developed 
elsewhere as an over-arching "umbrella brand" which spans a wide range 
of product categories.54
04 That retailers have brands that reach across produce catagories has long been 
recognised and analysed by economists. For example Wernerfelt (1988) and Cabral 
(2000) develop models of umbrella branding (or "reputation stretching") and show 
how the firm can use its reputation from one product to signal the high quality of 
another one. Such a move can be credible, as if the second product turn out to 
be low quality that will negatively affect consumers’ beliefs over the quality of the 
original product, and reduce their willingness to pay. Choi (1998) develops a model 
where umbrella branding (or "brand extension") relies upon the fact that a cheating 
firm loses out through being unable to use the brand name to introduce high quality 
products in the future.
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Analysing the model, we see that the pre-merger situation is the same 
as before, with the incumbent receiving a competitive wholesale price and 
limit pricing at P\ = P * to just deter entry.
Consider now the post-merger situation; upon entry P 2’s optimum 
strategy is still to marginally undercut R\ and charge a price of P2* — P\ • 
However, the entrant now benefits from Bertrand competition between 
the merged supplier, Si+2, and the competitive fringe, S 3 , and is thus 
now still able to secure a competitive wholesale price of c. Therefore, 
he has the same entry decision rule that he had pre-merger, that is he 
should enter if
P1 > P*
Where P* is again defined implicitly by the minimum value that sat­
isfies the following equation.
(P* -  c) Q{P*) = F
Therefore, when we turn to consider the pricing decision of the in­
cumbent monopolist we get the following result
Proposition 28 I f  the incumbent retailer does not possess countervail­
ing power, but the potential entrant does, then the merger does not lead 
to an increase in prices to consumers; R i will still price at Pi = P* to 
deter entry.
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Proof. See Appendix. ■
The key insight here is that it is not the incumbent retailer’s costs that 
are the key driver for his price setting, it is the competitive constraint 
placed upon him by the threat of entry. Since the countervailing power of 
the potential entrant allows that threat to remain undiminished following 
the merger the incumbent retailer is unable to increase his price.
The merged supplier 5 i+ 2 will set a wholesale price to i?iof
Wi = P*
The merged entity hereby appropriates all of the profits earned in the 
industry. He will not find it profitable to set a higher wholesale price as 
this will drive P i to set a higher retail price which will induce entry by 
the incumbent who will undercut R \ , and the merged entity will have to 
engage in Bertrand competition with S 3 to serve R 2 and will earn zero 
profits.
So this model presents an unexpected case when the countervailing 
buyer power defence may be applicable, even though the incumbent re­
tailer possesses no buyer power. This is in contrast to the earlier model 
where we demonstrated that sometimes the defence may not be applica­
ble, even though it appears to be.
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7.5 A n alysis and  Im p lica tion s for P o licy  M akers
7.5.1 The Countervailing Power D efence in Practice
Before proceeding to discuss the implications of our findings for policy 
makers, we first investigate the existing manner in which the counter­
vailing buyer power argument has been used in practice in both Europe 
and the US. We investigate several mergers in which the argument has 
appeared, discuss its importance to these cases and examine the manner 
in which it was used.
We note how it was ultimately treated by regulators and the courts, 
and then later draw together these insights with those of our model to 
present some suggested guidelines for how competition authorities should 
treat this argument in the future.
U nited  States In the United States, although the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines make no explicit mention of countervailing buyer power as a 
merger defence it has been used several times in practice.
For example in the Country Lake Foods case the court considered 
a merger between two firms in the fluid milk processing industry and 
recognised the countervailing power of the large food corporations who 
purchased the milk from these processors. The downstream industry had 
a three-firm concentration ratio of over 90%, and the court recognised 
their ability to enter the processing market themselves. The merger was 
eventually allowed to proceed, with the court commenting that it found
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the countervailing buyer power defence the "most persuasive argument" 
that the firms put forward.55
Similarly, in the 1990 Baker Hughes decision the Judge noted that 
the main purchasers of complex mining equipment were sophisticated 
firms who would insist upon receiving confidential bids for each contract. 
Furthermore, it was judged that these purchasers would likely be able 
to encourage successful entry into the U.S. market by Canadian sup­
pliers should the merger result in higher prices. Note that in this case 
the countervailing power was connected to the retailers’ sophistication, 
not simply their size, which re-emphasises the point that understanding 
and being precise about the source of any hypothesised buyer power is 
essential whenever applying the concept in practice .56
Furthermore, in U.S. v. Calmar the court recognised the countervail­
ing power of the downstream firms, noting that following any increase in 
the price of pump dispensers and sprayers the buyers of these products 
would react by either vertically integrating or entering into joint ventures 
to produce the goods themselves.57
However, the limitations of the countervailing power defence have also 
been recognised in several cases, for example in United Tote. Here, among 
the customers for pari-mutuel computer systems the largest purchasers 
controlled about half of the betting volume, with the rest accounted for
55United States v. Country Lake Foods, 754 F. Supp. 669 (D. Minn. 1990).
06United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See Kleit 
and Coate (1993).
o7United States v. Calmar, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.J. 1985).
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by small and medium-sized buyers. It was recognised by the court that 
there was already a difference between the amount paid by the largest 
tracks and the rest, and so it refused to rely on the larger retailers to 
protect the more vulnerable smaller buyers and ordered a divestiture to 
undo the merger.58
In a related vein, Steptoe (1993) notes that in the recent Kodak de­
cision, although it was not a merger case, the Supreme Court made a 
point of direct relevance to the use of the countervailing power defence
" [I]f a company is able to price-discriminate between sophis­
ticated and unsophisticated consumers, the sophisticated will 
be unable to prevent the exploitation of the uninformed." 59
E u ro p e  The European Commission has used the countervailing buyer 
power argument in several cases. For example, in the market for liquid 
packaging board the Commission first cleared the merger between Enso 
and Stora, and then later cleared a merger to near-duopoly between Ko- 
rsnas and Assi Doman Cartonboard .60 These cases featured buyers of 
differing power downstream, and in line with its guidelines the Commis­
sion specifically considered the ability of the smaller retailers to constrain 
price rises post merger.
Firstly, they examined the possibility of retailers switching suppliers;
58United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Del. 1991).
59Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct 2072, 2086-87 
(1992).
60See Baker and Lofaro (2000) for a discussion of the Enso/Stora case; and Karlsson 
(2006) for details of Korsnas and Assi Doman Cartonboard.
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they concluded that even the lesser amounts bought by these smaller 
retailers were crucial for the profitability of the suppliers. They noted 
that the industry is characterised by high fixed costs and therefore high 
mark-ups on each unit sold; therefore the loss of only a small volume of 
sales can have a significant effect upon supplier profits.61
In addition, the Commission also found that the smaller retailers were 
still large enough to support an upstream entrant if necessary; therefore 
they too had sufficient buyer power to protect themselves from price rises. 
Interestingly, the Commission also noted that it wouldn’t be in the best 
interests of the merged entity to price discriminate and raise prices to less 
powerful buyers even if they could. They pointed out that this could be 
counter-productive in the long run as it could serve to drive the smaller 
retailers out of business, leaving the suppliers facing a monopsonistic 
buyer.62
This is not the only European case where countervailing power has 
been important however.63 In 2000 Philip Morris notified the Commis­
sion of its intention to purchase consumer products (particularly biscuits) 
producer Nabisco and combine it with its subsidiary Kraft Foods; this 
raised competitive concerns within the chocolate confectionery market in
61 This relates to the issue of economic dependency, for example as discussed in 
OECD (1998).
62This relates to the work of Chemla (2003) who examines a supplier’s incentives 
to encourage downstream competition. He shows that as competition downstream  
falls, industry profit increases (because it is not dissipated by competition between 
retailers), but the supplier’s share of this profit falls, as his bargaining position weak­
ens. It is this latter effect that the Commission appears to be referring to, although 
Chemla notes that which of these two effects dominates depends upon the specifics 
of the bargaining game between suppliers and retailers.
63 For a discussion of several of the following cases, see Scheelings and Wright (2006).
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the Netherlands. The merger was allowed to pass, with one of the most 
persuasive arguments being that of countervailing power
" [Most stores] are in a position to exercise sufficient bar­
gaining power for these types of products. Large retailers 
account for nearly [50-60] % of chocolate confectionery pur­
chases in the Netherlands... Since the success of a choco­
late confectionery manufacturer’s products depends largely 
on access to shelf-space, retailers can exercise strong buying 
power." 64
Similarly, in 1999 Granaria, Ultje, Intersnack and May Holding pro­
posed a joint venture to process, market and distribute nut snacks; com­
bining their existing business operations in this area. The venture was 
estimated to result in the parties possessing large market shares in many 
European markets, particularly in Denmark, France and Germany where 
it was expected to be over 40%.
However, despite this the Commission cleared the firms to go ahead 
because it noted the countervailing power of retailers. In particular, it 
commented that a significant element of this power was derived from 
the fact that the retailers possessed private labels - the specific form of 
countervailing power we focus upon in our model.
"In conclusion, the nut snacks sector is characterised by
64European Commission (2000), Case No COM P/M .2072 - Phillip Morris/Nabisco, 
para. 25.
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the very strong presence of retailers’ own labels. By control­
ling their own brands, the retailers are able to use multiple 
suppliers and to switch between suppliers. Combined with 
the high level of concentration of the retailers as customers of 
the parties, this creates significant countervailing purchaser 
power...The Commission therefore considers tha t the concen­
tration will not provide the parties with the power to increase 
prices of their nut snacks above the competitive level."65
A similar finding was made by the Commission in the merger be­
tween Friesland Coberco and Nutricia in 2001. In this merger the parties 
business areas overlapped in both the flavoured dairy drinks and coffee 
whiteners markets (in the "retail" channel and the "food service" chan­
nels in both cases). However, the Commission ultimately cleared the 
merger, partially on the basis of the countervailing buyer power of the 
retailers that the firms sell their products too. Again, the role of private 
labels was identified as key, for example it was commented in the market 
for coffee whiteners that
"Sustainable price increases from the parties are not likely 
due to the strong countervailing power of the customers. The 
four biggest customers account for [70-80]% and [80-90]% of 
total sales in the retail market of FCDF and NDDG respec­
65 European Commission (2000), Case No C O M P/JV.32 - Gra- 
naria/Ultje/Intersnack/M ay Holding, para. 60.
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tively, which demonstrates the strong position of these buy­
ers vis-a-vis the merging parties. As in the case of flavoured 
dairy drinks these customers are large retail chains in the 
Netherlands such as Albert Heijn, Superunie, Schuitema and 
Laurus, which can again express their buying power through 
their own private labels. According to the market test every 
retail chain has at least one private label for coffee whiteners, 
which together account for [30-40]%- [60-70]% of the market 
as mentioned above."66
The various cases discussed above serve to demonstrate the impor­
tance of the countervailing buyer power defence in antitrust. Although 
they don’t relate to the precise mechanism that we present in our paper, 
of the merger having an anticompetitive impact through the creation of 
a barrier to entry, they do illustrate the need for economists to more 
fully analyse the argument to understand under which conditions it is 
more likely to be valid in order to give policymakers clearer guidance. 
Our model does more closely relate to two of the cases above, Granaria, 
Ultje, Intersnack & May Holding ,and Friesland Coberco and Nutricia, 
as in these cases the source of buyer power was the presence of private 
label goods which is what we focus on in our model.
66European Commission (2001), Case No COM P/M .2399 - Friesland
Coberco/Nutricia para. 45.
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7.5.2 R ecom m endations for Practitioners
Based upon insights from the literature, the findings of our model and 
practical evidence from the cases we have examined we now make sev­
eral recommendations for the use of the countervailing power defence by 
practitioners.
The first key point is that any argument that there exists buyer power 
downstream must show that the conjectured power is "effective". That 
is, by some means retailers would be able to prevent suppliers increasing 
their wholesale prices following the merger. Note that it is not sufficient 
to argue that a retailer possesses countervailing power simply because of 
his size; though size may indeed be a good place to start when assessing 
buyer power, it is not in itself a sufficient condition for buyer power to ex­
ist. Doyle and Inderst (2007) note that such a size argument would need 
to be precise about the mechanism through which a powerful buyer could 
leverage his size to enable him to secure discounts during negotiations.67
Generally, it is important that any claim of buyer power is backed 
up by clearly and transparently presenting a detailed theory as to how 
a retailer has power over his suppliers. Possibilities include the threat of 
integrating backwards as modelled in Katz (1987) and used in the Coun­
try Lake Foods and Calmar cases, buyer sophistication as recognised by 
Nordemann (1995) and used in the Baker Hughes case, the ability to 
sponsor entry upstream as discussed by Inderst and Shaffer (2007b) or
67In a bargaining framework, the argument would have to demonstrate how size 
would improve the retailer’s outside option, or deteriorate the supplier’s.
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damaging the supplier’s outside option as in Inderst and Wey (2007a). 
Other possibilities recognised in the literature include the retailer’s po­
sition as a gatekeeper as noted by Majumdar (2006), the supplier being 
economically dependent upon the retailer as recognised in OECD (1998) 
and used to some extent in Enso/Stora, a supplier’s convex cost function 
as in Inderst and Wey (2007a), a retailer’s multiple sourcing strategy 
as discussed in Inderst (2007b) or the possession of a private label as 
in our paper and used in Granaria/Ultje/Intersnack/May Holding and 
Friesland Coberco/Nutricia.
The advantage of such transparency is twofold; firstly, as in any eco­
nomic debate it lays open the arguments for discussion, allowing all par­
ties concerned to analyse the assumptions underlying the model, and 
to empirically analyse whether the proposed theory seems to accurately 
reflect reality. But secondly, and crucially, it is important to recognise 
that buyer power is not a homogenous concept, and that the implica­
tions of buyer power may depend crucially upon the exact mechanism 
at work. The implications of an upstream merger may differ depending 
upon the nature of the buyer power in question: buyer power originating 
from private labels could potentially have different consequences than 
countervailing power based upon retailer sophistication .68
A key point to bear in mind when applying this argument is that the 
buyer power in question must cover all of the retailers in the downstream
68For example, one key issue is whether the merger would somehow destroy the 
hypothesised buyer power, which may depend upon the mechanism at work.
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market as discussed in Inderst and Shaffer (2007b) and mentioned in the 
United Tote case. This issue is explicitly recognised in the EU merger 
guidelines which state that
"Countervailing buyer power cannot be found to sufficiently 
off-set potential adverse effects of a merger if it only ensures 
that a particular segment of customers, with particular bar­
gaining strength, is shielded from significantly higher prices 
or deteriorated conditions after the merger".
If powerful buyers are able to keep their input prices down, but smaller 
or less powerful buyers are not, then this will serve to create an imbalance 
in the downstream market. Stronger retailers will benefit from the raised 
costs of their smaller rivals, and will likely be able to increase their market 
share further, creating worries of market power downstream .69 Crucially, 
our results suggest that this question of "how wide is the shield" of coun­
tervailing power should be extended still further beyond current market 
participants to also include potential entrants.
Finally, our findings highlight the importance of distinguishing be­
tween the implications of countervailing buyer power for wholesale prices 
and for final prices. Traditionally the two are implicitly considered to 
be the same; so that retail prices will not rise if and only if wholesale 
prices remain unchanged. Conventional thinking would therefore give us
69Indeed, the fact that the powerful retailer has been able to keep his input prices 
from rising could result in those of his less powerful rivals increasing even more than 
they would have had he not possessed the buyer power, a "waterbed effect"; see 
Majumdar (2006).
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the following table of buyer power and price effects, which only depends 
upon the countervailing power of the incumbent.
Table 4: Effect on Prices of a Merger - Traditional Analysis
Entrant
W ith BP Without BP
Incum bent W ith BP Unchanged Unchanged
W ithout BP Increase Increase
Our results challenge this view, emphasising the need to also focus 
attention upon the role of entrants and potential competitors. We get 
the following table of effects.
Table 5: Effect on Prices of a Merger - Our Analysis_____
Entrant
W ith BP Without BP
Incum bent W ith BP Unchanged Increase
W ithout BP Unchanged Increase
Our analysis mirrors traditional analysis when both the incumbent 
and potential entrant possess the same degree of countervailing power, 
but disagree when they differ. When the incumbent possesses power but 
the entrant doesn’t, our results suggests that retail prices may still rise. 
This is because, although the countervailing power has prevented input 
prices rising to the incumbent, reduced competition now allows him to 
increase his margins and charge more for the product. Similarly, when 
it is only the entrant that possess buyer power, our results suggest retail 
prices will not rise because the increase in input prices are prevented 
from being passed on by the threat of entry, and therefore the incumbent 
suffers a margin squeeze.
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Therefore, our results emphasise the need to understand the nature of 
the buyer power in detail, to examine the implications of the merger for 
wholesale prices, but also to remember that the competitive conditions 
downstream still play a key role in determining if there will be any change 
in the level of retail prices.
7.6  C onclu sion s
We have shown that the use of the countervailing buyer power merger 
defence is more complex that previously thought. Some mergers which 
may appear harmless due to the ability of powerful buyer to prevent 
wholesale prices rising may still result in anticompetitive effects. This 
is because any potential entrants to the industry that lack buyer power 
would face higher wholesale prices following the merger; this serves to 
create a barrier to entry in the retail market. In addition, if the threat of 
entry is key in constraining the pricing of incumbent firm (that is, if the 
market is contestable), then this barrier to entry will allow these firms 
to increase their retail prices following the merger.
However, we also demonstrated a situation where the countervailing 
power defence may be applicable where at first glance it appears irrele­
vant. That is, even if incumbent firms possesses no buyer power, retail 
prices may not rise following the merger if the potential entrant does 
have countervailing power. The logic is that the entrant’s threat of entry 
is, with countervailing power, undiminished following the concentration
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so the incumbent retailer is unable to raise his retail price even though 
his own costs will have risen. These results hold whether we use linear 
or two-part tariffs, which is unusual in the literature.
We noted in our discussion that in any such case it is important to be 
precise about the source of buyer power, simply arguing that a retailer 
possesses countervailing power because of his large size in insufficient. If 
such a size argument is used, it is important that the exact mechanism 
whereby a large retailer leverages his size to obtain preferential prices 
from his suppliers must be carefully explained.
In fact, in our main model we used the presence of private label goods 
- not size related - as the source of buyer power, and we argued that the 
main result of the paper carries over to different models of buyer power. 
That is, it could also be the potential to integrate backwards, to cover the 
fixed cost of switching to an alternate supplier, or to sponsor upstream 
entry. All that is necessary to generate our results is that any rival retailer 
would, upon entry, not possess the buyer power of the incumbent, and 
would thus be exposed to higher input prices.
However, we also emphasised that whenever practitioners use the con­
cept of buyer power in practice they must be precise about the exact the­
ory or model they are using. This precision will ensure their reasoning 
stands up to scrutiny (for example preventing simplistic "buyer size is 
buyer power" fallacies), and will also make it easier to understand and 
predict market outcomes, as crucially different types of buyer power can
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have different market consequences.
7.7  A p p en d ix
7.7.1 P roof of Lem m a 19
After entering R 2 would face the same production costs as Ri, c, and 
would be charging the same price, P\\ his flow profits will therefore equal 
those of Ri, had entry not occurred. R 2 will enter if his flow profits 
after entry would cover the sunk cost of entering the market, which will 
therefore happen if Ri prices above this level. 70
7.7.2 P roof of Lem m a 20
We saw in Lemma 19 that entry will occur if R\ prices above this level, 
and if this happens then he will earn zero profits. Furthermore, since we 
have P * < P M we have that profit is increasing for P  G [0, P*], so the 
incumbent will never want to price below P*. Therefore in equilibrium 
he raises his price as far as he can, but provided that it is still just not 
worth R 2 paying the entry cost.
7.7.3 P roof of Lemma 21
The incumbent retailer still benefits from Bertrand competition between 
the merged entity and the unbranded supplier, and so he still gets offered
70 We implicitly adopt the tie-breaking rule here that if the R 2 is indifferent, he will 
not enter. This is to simplify the exposition and remove the need for the incumbent 
to engage in e" pricing, but doesn’t affect the results. Furthermore, it actually 
makes sense: a firm would never go throught he time consuming, costly and risky 
business of entering a market if it expected to earn no extra profit from doing so.
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a linear price of c.
7.7.4 P roof of Proposition 22
Following the merger, upon entry R 2 would face a monopoly supplier, so 
his wholesale price would no longer be competed down to the competitive 
level. Instead the supplier S1+2 , knowing exactly what price R 2 will 
set upon entry, will proceed to extract the full amount of the profit by 
charging him a wholesale price equal to icj =  P\.11 That is, the merged 
entity will take all of the flow profits from R 2 , so following entry the 
entrant makes losses equal to F, and will therefore never choose to enter 
the market as he cannot recover the cost of doing so. This compares to 
the pre-merger situation where we showed in Lemma 19 that he would 
enter the industry if Pi > P*.
7.7.5 P roof of Proposition 23
The threat of entry now no longer constrains the pricing of Ri, who is 
free to raise his price to the monopoly level P£ = P M.
7.7.6 P roof of Lemma 24
The outcome of the bargaining process is given by that value of the tariff 
which maximises the Nash product.
71 This is not the only contract offer that the supplier can use to extract the full 
surplus. He could instead offer the two-part tariff (c, n*(P1*)), which yields the same 
amount of profit. We focus upon the linear offer because it is the simplest form of 
contract available, and so we require no assumption on the sophistication of contracts 
used. This type of contract is, of course, a subset of all more sophisticated contractual 
forms; for example this linear contract is a two part tariff offer of (P i,0 ) .
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t 2 = argmax |  [Il#2 (r2) -  0 R2]a [n5l+2 (r2) -  O s1+2]: *}
Where Or 2 and Os1+2 represent the outside-options of P 2 and the 
merged supplier Si+2 respectively should negotiations break down. How­
ever, note that if the entrant fails to source off this supplier, he has no 
other means of supply and is thus unable to sell anything; we therefore 
have that Or2 =  0. Similarly, if the supplier fails to strike a deal with 
this retailer he is not able to somehow sell more of the good elsewhere; 
note that even if it was he who made a deal with the incumbent retailer 
it was for zero per-unit profit, thus any deal (or failure to deal) with P 2 
doesn’t affect this. Therefore we also have Os1+2 =  0.
Taking first order conditions with respect to r 2 we get that
« n Sl+2 (r2) ^  + (1 -  a) n fl2 (r2) ^ ± 1  =  0
Furthermore, we can note that n,s1+2 ( r 2) =  r 2, as the marginal whole­
sale price just covers the cost of production. We also have n # 2 ( r 2) =  
II (Pi) — t 2, because upon entry P 2 will earn whatever profit the incum­
bent would have earned had entry not occurred, as he too has marginal 
cost c and prices at P\ (as previously established), and pay the fixed fee 
to the supplier. We therefore have = — 1, and =  1. This
gives us
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(1 -  a) (URl(Pi) -  t 2) - « t 2 =  0
t \ =  (1 -  a) IIr, (Pi)
This gives us
= oiHRl (Pi)
So, because of the fact that neither party has an outside-option the 
total profit is simply split by the exogenous sharing rule. As you would 
expect, each firm earns more profit the greater their bargaining power is.
7.7.7 P roof of Lemma 25
Similar to the previous proof, we have the wholesale price determined by 
the following
w2 = arg max R2 (w2 ) -  O r X  [IIs1+2 {w2) -  |
Which again reduces to
anSl+2 M  ^  + (1 -  a)  n*2 ( w2) = 0
O W 2 U W 2
Here we have n5l+2 =  (w2 -  c)Q(P2) and =  (P2 -  w 2 )Q(P2).
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Unlike most situations, here changes in the wholesale price do not affect 
prices or quantities because, as previously noted, we have that the entrant 
would set his price as P2* — Pi •> irrespective of the level of wholesale price 
(provided w 2 < Pi). We therefore get =  —Q(Pl), and 9 ^ 2+2 =  
Q(Pi), which gives us
a(w 2 -  c)Q(Pi) (-Q (P i))  +  (1 -  a) (Pi -  w2 )Q(P1 )Q(Pl ) = 0
(1  -  a) (Pi -  w2) -- a(w 2 — c)
W2 = olc +  (1  — a) Pi
This makes intuitive sense; since we know what the price will be it is 
simply a question of how this mark-up will be divided between suppliers 
and retailers. We get that the wholesale price is a weighted average of 
the marginal cost (the lowest it could be) and the retail price (the highest 
it could be), with the bargaining power as the weight. Substituting this 
wholesale price into the entrant’s profit function we determine that upon 
entry he will earn
11^ =  a(P i -  c)Q(Pi) =  aURl(Pi)
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7.7.8 Proof of Proposition 26
Upon entry iV s  flow profit is 0:11^ (Pi), which is greater than the entry 
cost F  when the condition is met.
7.7.9 Proof of Proposition 27
We saw with Proposition 26 that R 2 will enter if 11^ (Pi) > there­
fore the incumbent retailer will find it optimal to limit price at Pi =  P**, 
where P** is defined as the lowest value of P  that satisfies (P — c) Q(P) = 
—. This is unless — > UM in which case the retailer will price at thea  a  1
monopoly level as the threat of entry no longer binds at all as the poten­
tial entrant will never be able to profitably enter.
7.7.10 Proof of Proposition 28
Now, as previously, P i prices to just deter entry, since if entry occurs he 
makes zero profits. Thus, unless his wholesale price is higher, he charges 
the maximum price he can which still deters entry, P*.
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8 Final Conclusion
This thesis has examined the important issue of private labels, a topic 
which raises many currently unanswered questions such as what these 
goods are, why are they introduced into a market, and what impact do 
they have upon competition? Reflecting the multi-faceted nature of the 
debate itself, we have presented three separate models which examine 
different aspects of the private label question.
In the first paper we took a new perspective upon the role of branding 
in retailing, and argued that it played a role of quality certification, 
reassuring consumers that are wary of purchasing a low quality product. 
We interpreted the presence of a private labels as the retailer taking 
over the role of quality assurance from the supplier, and investigated 
what his motivation for doing so could be. We demonstrated that by 
establishing his own brand the retailer improves his negotiating position 
with suppliers as it increases the number of manufacturers that he is able 
to source his inputs from.
Without his own brand the retailer is effectively only able to sell 
the goods of suppliers that have established their own brand, consumers 
would be unwilling to purchase the unbranded goods of rival suppliers. 
However, with his own brand he is able to market the goods of these 
alternative suppliers under his own label and certify their quality him­
self. This therefore increases competition between suppliers, improves 
his outside option during negotiations, and allows him to keep a greater
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proportion of the industry profits for himself.
Using this model to examine the impact of the introduction of pri­
vate labels upon welfare, we showed that they can only serve to make 
people better off. In some circumstances their presence leaves firms and 
consumers no better or worse off than the situation without them, how­
ever in other cases the introduction of store brands can strictly improve 
economic welfare. This will be the case when the market would other­
wise suffer from a hold-up problem, with suppliers’ possessing too little 
bargaining power leaving them unwilling to undertake the investments 
necessary for brand-building themselves, meaning the good would be sold 
uncertified leaving everybody worse off.
In the second paper we examined how the presence of private labels 
in a market affects competition between retailers. However, unlike the 
majority of the literature that simply focuses upon prices, we examined 
the effect of their presence upon non-price competition and dynamic in­
centives, particularly with respect to product quality. To do this we 
adopted a vertical framework and analysed how the sale of a store brand 
by a chain retailer affects the incentives to invest of the upstream man­
ufacturer that supplies the other downstream retailers.
We demonstrated the complexity of the issue by illustrating several 
possible effects. For example a competition effect could lead to their 
introduction resulting in greater investment by the supplier, meaning 
consumers are strictly better off. This could arise if the private label
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threatens to steal market share from the incumbent supplier who now 
competes more vigorously and improves his product more than if he 
were a monopolist.
Furthermore, we also showed that a retailer may well have an incen­
tive to invest in a private label even if he never ends up actually selling 
it, as then it plays the role of an outside option in his negotiations with 
the supplier. The higher the quality of the store brand the more power­
ful the threat to introduce it, which means the retailer can secure larger 
discounts from the manufacturer. The supplier may then in turn have a 
greater incentive to invest in improving the quality of his product as this 
serves to reduce the value of the retailer’s outside option, allowing him 
in turn to gain a greater share of the industry profits.
However, we also demonstrated that the introduction of private labels 
is not necessarily pro-competitive. Instead of there being a competition 
effect there could also potentially be a forestalling effect, where the intro­
duction of these goods leads to the supplier cutting back his investment 
resulting in smaller retailers downstream seeing their competitive posi­
tions deteriorate. This could be the case because with the introduction 
of a store brand the supplier sells his product through fewer outlets, and 
so has reduced opportunities to recoup his investment.
In the third paper we examined the implications of private labels for 
the wider issues of buyer power and merger control. Since the possession 
of a store brand can allow a retailer to source from alternative suppliers
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it can grant him a degree of buyer power. Therefore if there was a 
merger taking place between suppliers that the competition authorities 
were sceptical about, it could be argued that it should be allowed to 
proceed as this situation could constitute an example of the presence of 
countervailing buyer power.
This is the idea that an otherwise problematic merger should be al­
lowed to complete because the merged entity will be unable to raise 
wholesale prices post-merger because the powerful retailer possess coun­
tervailing power and will not allow him to do so. We demonstrate that 
private labels can play such a role, potentially enabling the retailer to 
prevent any increase in his input prices, but that this is not necessar­
ily sufficient to ameliorate the anti-competitive effects of the merger. 
We show that the merger can serve to raise barriers to entry to the 
downstream market, which can then potentially reduce the competitive 
constraints acting upon the retailer allowing him to raise retail prices.
We also illustrated a potentially unexpected application of the coun­
tervailing power argument, which is that even if the incumbent retailer 
cannot prevent an increase in his input prices, final prices may not rise 
if the threat of entry remains undiminished post-merger. That is, for a 
countervailing power argument to be applicable it is not actually nec­
essary for the incumbent retailer to have the power, instead it can be 
sufficient for a potential entrant to instead.
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